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i
“Um poĺıtico pensa nas próximas eleições.





Há uma sensação generalizada na sociedade brasileira sobre a vulnerabilidade fis-
cal da economia do Brasil. Em vista disso, o objetivo deste trabalho é contribuir
para a discussão sobre o papel da poĺıtica fiscal como ferramenta de est́ımulo
econômico. Para tanto, analisou-se algumas propostas de poĺıtica fiscal para a
economia brasileira, tanto do lado do gasto público, quanto do lado da deson-
eração tributária. Para tanto, foi desenvolvido um modelo DSGE Novo-keynesiano
para uma economia pequena e fechada com seis choques fiscais: gasto corrente do
governo; investimento público; transferência de renda às famı́lias; desoneração do
imposto sobre o consumo; desoneração do imposto sobre a renda do trabalho; e
desoneração do imposto sobre a renda do capital. Os parâmetros fiscais foram
estimados usando a metodologia Bayesiana, enquanto os outros parâmetros foram
calibrados. As poĺıticas de desoneração tributária apresentaram melhores resulta-
dos do que as poĺıticas de gasto público. Principalmente, a desoneração do tributo
sobre a renda do trabalho. Entre as poĺıticas de gasto, o investimento público
foi o único choque que apresentou resultado positivo em relação ao PIB. Resum-
idamente, o resultado obtido é que poĺıticas voltadas para o aumento da oferta
agregada possúıram um resultado mais expressivo e sem pressionar a taxa de in-
flação.
Abstract
There is a widespread feeling in Brazilian society about the fiscal vulnerability of
Brazil’s economy. In view of this, the objective this work is to contribute to the
discussion about the role of fiscal policy as economic stimulus tool. We discuss
some proposals of fiscal policy for the Brazilian economy, both on the side of public
spending and on the side of tax reduction. Thus, a New-Keynesian DSGE model
for a small closed economy with six fiscal shocks (current government spending,
public investment, income transfers to households, tax reduction on consump-
tion, tax reduction on labor income and tax reduction on capital income) was
developed. The fiscal parameters were estimated using the Bayesian methodology,
while the other parameters were calibrated. The policies of tax reduction showed
better results than the policies of public spending. Mostly, the tax reduction on
labor income. Among policies spending, public investment was the only shock that
showed positive results in relation to GDP. Briefly, the result is that policies aimed
at increasing aggregate supply had a more significant result, without to press the
inflation rate.
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In the 1980s and 1990s, the Brazilian economic literature was concerned to diag-
nose and propose solutions to the inflationary process. With the implementation
of the Plano Real, the country experienced a panorama of low inflation. So com-
bat this problem has stopped occupy the center of attention of researchers, giving
place to the study of fiscal vulnerability, considered the largest and most direct
threat to the development of the Brazilian economy.
To collaborate with the discussion of the Brazilian fiscal vulnerability, this thesis
studies the role of fiscal policy as economic stimulus tool. So, this study will an-
alyze possibilities of fiscal policy for the Brazilian economy, both on the side of
public spending and on the side of tax reduction. For this purpose six stochastic
shocks will be performed in a DSGE model: current government spending; public
investment; transfer income to households; tax reduction on consumption; tax re-
duction on labor income; and tax reduction on capital income.
The chapters are structured following the procedures of building the DSGE model
of this study, solving it, estimating it and analyzing it. Figure 1.1 gives a visual
overview of all steps.
Chapter 1 has the objective to present a small closed economy model. The ba-
sic framework contains equations that describe the behavior of the private sector
for consumption, labor, production, the pricing decisions, the setting of monetary
1
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Figure 1.1: Overview of Solution Method to DSGE Model of This Study.
Source: Prepared by the author.
and fiscal policies. The model is very simple, it has two frictions: monopolistic
competition and staggered pricing a la Calvo.
To solve it, we set up the economic model; derived the first-order equilibrium con-
ditions, together with the structural equations, these build a system of non-linear
stochastic difference equations; as this system usually does not have a closed ana-
lytical solution, the solution is approximated in the neighborhood of a given point,
in most cases the non-stochastic steady state which is determined in next step;
and either log-linear approximation around the steady-state leading to a system
of linear difference equations in state-space form and solution of this system with
the help of the usual procedures or second (or higher) order approximation around
the steady-state.
In the chapter 2, the model of this work has been solved, to proceed further we
need to parametrize the model economy, so this is the objective of chapter 3. The
parameters already known and well accepted in DSGE Brazilian literature were
calibrated, the main calibration procedure adopted here is to obtain the values of
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parameters from other relevant DSGE work in the literature.
The discussions on shocks that represent the proposed fiscal policies will be dis-
cussed in chapters 4 (shocks to public spending) and 5 (shocks to tax reduction).
The analysis is based using the variance decomposition and the impulse response
functions for each of the shocks1.
1In the body of the thesis only fiscal shocks will be presented, other shocks are presented in
Appendix A
Chapter 2
DSGE Model: Basic Structure
Introduction
The 1980s has witnessed a major breakthrough in the field of macroeconomic mod-
eling. The first examples of this new methodology emerged from the models of
real business cycles (RBC), primarily through the groundbreaking work of Kyd-
land and Prescott (1982). Its builders were criticized for focusing the analysis on
only one type of shock and a kind of economic structure and for not recognizing
any active role for monetary policy. Therefore from the perspective of a central
bank, it was difficult to see how these models could bring any positive contribution
to the discussion of monetary policy.
Twenty years later, this controversy was completely dissipated. The main reason
was that the methodological innovation overlying the RBC models brought the
introduction of frictions that allowed the incorporation of Keynesian principles
and new shocks to the initial modeling. The success of this new model made it
possible for the main economic institutions to develop their own DSGE models as
did Central Bank of Brazil (SAMBA), European Central Bank (NAWM), Bank
of Canada (Totem), Bank of England (BEQM), Bank of Japan (JEM), Bank of
Chile (MAS), European Community (QUESTIII) and the International Monetary
Fund (GEM)). Nowadays, DSGE models are used to answer almost any behavior
of an economic phenomenon, including issues related to fiscal policy.
4
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The objective of this chapter is to present a small closed economy model. The ba-
sic framework contains equations that describe the behavior of the private sector
for consumption, labor, production, the pricing decisions, the setting of monetary
and fiscal policies. The model is very simple, it has two frictions: monopolistic
competition and staggered pricing a la Calvo. However, this model is enough
to the objective this work: to contribute to the discussion about fiscal policy on
Brazilian Economy. It will be analyzed the behavior of the macroeconomics vari-
ables in relation to three alternatives of public expenditure: current spending;
income transfers to households; and investment in public capital. About govern-
ment revenue, it will be studied tax reduction in the taxes on consumption, on
labor income and on capital income.
One of the central assumption of the neoclassical approach is the existence of per-
fect competition in goods and input markets. This resulted in market prices that
are equal the marginal cost of production, zero profits for firms and a price for the
productive factors equal to the marginal productivity. In this context, there is no
market power affecting the determinations of prices. However, empirical evidence
shows the existence of markups in the goods and services markets, which means
that the prices of these goods are higher than their marginal cost.
Another neoclassical approach’s principle is the fully flexible price model, how-
ever a more realistic model has need to incorporate sticky price setting. The new
neoclassical synthesis models represent a response to the rational expectations rev-
olution. In this latest paradigm, economic agents are modeled as forward-looking,
and information is gleaned from the structure of the macroeconomic. However,
this approach also has that agents can be backward-looking, meaning there is iner-
tia in price setting due to institutional constraints such as overlapping contracts.
Here we consider the existence of imperfect competition in the production sec-
tor and staggered pricing a la Calvo. In particular, the model this work can be
called New Keynesian Model. Because following much of the literature, a model
of staggered price setting due to Calvo (1993) and characterized by random price
durations is referred to this denomination.
Despite the importance of the government as being responsible for public invest-
ment in infrastructure to support the private sector, there are few references about
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this subject. Some theoretical work of the 1970s incorporated public capital in the
aggregate production function, with examples by Arrow and Kurz (1970), Weitz-
man (1970) and Pestieau (1974). However, it is from the work of Barro (1990) that
these initial ideas are recovered. Another sequence of works following this line of
thought as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Finn (1993), Glomm and Raviku-
mar (1994), Cashin (1995) and Bajo (2000), among others. Among the empirical
studies that use this same approach, one can highlight Mera (1973), Ratner (1983)
and Aschauer (1989). The main assumption in relation to public investment in
this study follows this form of treatment.
This chapter begins with this introduction and section one presenting the eco-
nomic model, with section two defines the values of the steady state. The work
continues with the log-linearization of the model.
2.1 The Model
The economic model of this work is a small and closed economy with sectors for
households, firms, and government (Fiscal Authority and Monetary Authority).
This model has two frictions: monopolistic competition and staggered pricing a la
Calvo. The latter friction aims to avoid the model to have a very fast adjustment
in relation to shocks, a factor noticed in empirical evidence.
2.1.1 Households
We assume that households are able to maximize its intertemporal utility by choos-
ing consumption, savings, investment and leisure. For saving, the household can
choose between two different savings instruments - physical capital and govern-
ment bonds, indexed by j. Briefly, with the disposable income after payment of
taxes, the household can purchase consumer goods, capital goods, and/or govern-
ment bonds.
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Relying on the behavior described about the households, this agent chooses how
much to consume, how much to work and how much to acquire financial assets

































+Bj,t + TRANSj,t (2.2)
and in relation to the following law of motion of capital,
Kj,p,t+1 = (1− δp)Kj,p,t + Ij,p,t (2.3)
where Et is the expectations operator, β ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal discount
factor, C is the consumption of household, L is the labor, SC is the intertemporal
shock, SL is the shock on labor supply, ψ is the marginal disutility of labor and σ
is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In the budget constraint, P is the general price level, Ip is the investment of pri-
vate sector, B is the government bond maturing in one period, RIS is the risk
premium, RB is the rate of return on government bond (basic interest rate), W is
the wage, R is the return to capital, Kp is the private stock of capital, TRANS is
1The most common utility function to represent the choices of Household Representative is
the utility function of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) (Gali, 2008; Lim and McNelis,
2008; Clarida et al, 2002; Gali and Monacelli, 2005; Christoffel and Kuester, 2008; Christoffel et
al, 2009; Ravenna and Walsh, 2006). There are other common parameterizations for the utility




L0) (Hansen, 1985); and utility function that would be a combination of the logarithmic and of
the CRRA, U(Ct, Lt) = ln(Ct)− υ1+χL
1+χ
t (Gertler and Karadi, 2011).
2A utility function must has certain characteristics: UC > 0 and UL < 0, this means that
consumption and labor have a positive and a negative effects, respectively, over the happiness of
the households. On the other hand, UCC < 0 and ULL < 0, indicating that the utility function is
concave. This represents that if the consumption increases the utility level also increases, but in a
smaller and smaller proportion. Another assumption regarding the utility function says that this
function is additionally separable in time. This assumption allows to speak of an instantaneous
utility function, wherein the agent receives utility solely from consumption that performs at a
given moment in time.
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the income transfers to households by government, φc, φl and φk are the stochas-
tic components of tax reduction of the consumption tax, income tax on labor and
income tax on capital, respectively. While τc, τl, τk represent the static compo-
nents of the tax on consumption, income tax on labor, income tax on capital,
respectively. In this work, is being adopted the convention that Bt is the nom-
inal bond issued in (t-1) and matured in t34. Then, Bt+1 and Kt+1 are decided in t.
The household purchases of consumer goods (C) and investment goods (Ip) at the
price level (P ), also buys or sells government bonds(B) maturing in one period.
These bonds pay a rate (RB) with risk premium (RIS) (see Smets and Wouters
(2007) and Christoffel et al. (2008)), which interest is controlled by the monetary
authority.
This kind of agents pays three types of taxes (consumption tax, income tax on
labor and income tax on capital). Their income comes from four sources: labor
income, which depends on the level of nominal wages (W ); return on capital rental
to firms, which is a function of the rate of return to capital (R); income trans-
fers (TRANS) received of the government; and income from government bonds
acquired in the previous period (B).






































The first order conditions associated with the choices of Ct, Lt, Kp,t+1 and Bt+1
are respectively:
3In practice, each period a government usually issues bonds that mature at different times in
the future. For convenience, we assume that all bonds are issued for one period.


















































































An increase in the real wage rate motivates households to increase labor supply
and consumption demand. The same result is found in tax reduction in the tax
on consumption and tax on labor income5. Wealth effects can arise from shifts in
production function (positive shock on productivity) (discussion in section 2.1.2).
These effects show up first on firms’ profits. But it is important to remember that
the profits go to the households that own the firms. One new consideration is
the wealth effect from a change in the real wage rate, given the position of the




























where Ls is labor supply and Cd consumption demand.
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production function. An increase in W/P benefits the households that sell labor
services. But this benefit is matched by an extra cost for the firms, which buy
labor services. Since the firms are owned by households, the overall wealth effect
on households from a change in W/P is nil (Barro, 1997).


































It is possible to give an intuitive explanation for Euler equation (see Wickens,
2011). Consider the following problem: if we reduce Cj,t by a small amount dCj,t,
how much larger must Cj,t+1 be to fully compensate for this while leaving the value
of current and future utility (Vj,t) unchanged? We suppose that consumption be-
yond period t+1 remains unaffected. Thus we let Vj,t = U(Cj,t) + βEtU(Cj,t+1).
Taking the total differential of Vj,t, 0 = dVj,t = DUj,t+βEtdUj,t+1 = U
′(Cj,t)dCj,t+
βEtU















As the resource constraint (equation (2.2)) must be satisfied in every period, in




















[EtdCj,t+1 + Et+1dKj,p,t+2 − (1− δp)EtdKj,p,t+1]








As Kj,t is given and beyond period t+1 we are constraining the capital stock to
be unchanged, only the capital stock in period t+1 can be different from before.
Thus dKj,p,t = dKj,p,t+2 = 0. The resource constraints for periods t and t+1 can

































This can interpreted that the output no longer consumed in period t is invested







 dCj,t. All of this can
be consumed in period t+1. And as we do not wish to wish to increase the
capital stock beyond period t+1, the undepreciated increase in the capital stock,
−(1− δp)dCj,t, can also be consumed in period t+1. This gives the total increase
in consumption in period t+1. The discounted utility of this extra consumption















To keep Vj,t constant, this must be equal to the loss of utility in period t. Thus,
U ′(Cj,t)dCj,t = βEt
U ′(Cj,t+1)











Canceling dCt from both sides gives the Euler equation (equation (2.11)).
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2.1.1.1 Aggregation
The aggregate of this work follows the functional form (X = (1 − ω)Xp + ωXg)6
very common in this type of literature (Boscá et al, 2010; Gaĺı et al, 2007; Itawa,
2009; Coenen and Straub, 2004; Furlanetto, 2007; Dallari, 2012; Mayer et al, 2010;
Stahler and Thomas, 2011; Swarbrick, 2012; Motta and Tirelli, 2010; Dı́az, 2012;
Colciago, 2011; Mayer and Stahler, 2009; and Forni et al, 2009).
Thus, aggregate investment is given by:
It = (1− ωG)Ip,t + ωGIg,t (2.13)
where ωG is the participation of the public investment in the aggregate investment.
2.1.1.2 Shocks Related to Households
There are two shocks related to households’ behavior: the shock in intertemporal
preferences (SC) and the shock on labor supply (SL). While the first affects the
choice of intertemporal consumption, the second affects labor supply and deter-
mination of nominal wages. The shock SC was included to capture changes in
valuation between the present and the future which the literature on intertem-
poral behavior suggested as a key to the understanding of aggregate fluctuations
(Primiceri et al. 2006). Additionally the shock SL was added to model changes
in labor supply that Hall (1997) and Chari et al. (2007) identified as responsible
for major changes in employment over the business cycle. There are three other
shocks in the stochastic components of the taxes on consumption (φc), on labor
income (φl) and on capital income (φk). These shocks were included to character-
ize the stochastic component related to these three types of taxes. And the shock
in the risk premium. In fact, a positive shock to RIS reduces both consumption
and investment (because the households demand more public bonds), generating





Xh,tdh = (1− ω)XR,t + ωXNR,t.
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Thus, the movement rules of such shocks are presented below:
logSCt = (1− ρsc) logSCss + ρsc logSCt−1 + εsc,t (2.14)
logSLt = (1− ρsl) logSLss + ρsl logSLt−1 + εsl,t (2.15)
log φct = (1− ρc) log φcss + ρc log φct−1 + εc,t (2.16)
log φlt = (1− ρl) log φlss + ρl log φlt−1 + εl,t (2.17)
log φkt = (1− ρk) log φkss + ρk log φkt−1 + εk,t (2.18)
logRISt = (1− ρR) logRISss + ρR logRISt−1 + εR,t (2.19)
where εsc,t, εsl,t, εc,t, εl,t, εk,t, εR,t are exogenous shocks, and ρsc, ρsl, ρc, ρl, ρk, ρR
are autoregressive components, of the intertemporal shock, of the shock on labor
supply, of the shock of the taxes on consumption, on labor income, on capital
income and risk premium, respectively.
2.1.2 Firms
Following the comments of the introduction about the reasons for using a New
Keynesian model, the procedure to include monopolistic competition and sticky
pricing is to divide the productive sector of the economy into two subsectors: firm
producers of finished goods (retail); and firm producers of intermediate goods
(wholesale). The wholesale sector is formed by a great number of firms, each pro-
ducing a different good according to the structure of monopolistic competition. In
the retail industry, there is a single firm that aggregates intermediate goods in a
single good (Y ) that will be consumed by economic agents. Besides these features,
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it should be mentioned that the markets for productive factors follow a structure
of perfect competition. We consider a variant of this that is close related to work
by Gaĺı, Gertler and López-Salido (2001).
2.1.2.1 Firm Producers of Finished Goods (Retail)
First, it is necessary to define the aggregator behavior of the production function.
The finished good is produced by a single firm that operates in perfect competi-
tion. For this purpose, the firm combines a continuum of intermediate goods and











where Y is aggregate output, Yj is the intermediate product j, ϕ is the elasticity
of substitution between intermediate goods. The form adopted to aggregate the
assets is called an Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator (Dixit e Stiglitz, 1977).
As mentioned, the finished goods producer is in perfect competition and maxi-
mizes its profit by using the technology of equation (2.20), whereas the prices of
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Equation (2.22) demonstrates that the demand for intermediate good j is a de-
creasing function of its relative price and increasing in relation to the aggregate
output of the economy.
The assumption that there is perfect competition in the final goods market, al-























2.1.2.2 Firm Producers of intermediate goods (Wholesalers)
The wholesaler firms solve the problem in two steps. In the first step, firms take
as given the prices of production factors: wages (W ) and return to capital (R).
They determine the quantities of those inputs that will minimize their costs. In
the second stage, firms determine the optimal price of good j and they determine
the quantity that will be produced in accordance with this price.
First Step












This technology follows the works of Cassou and Lansing (1998), Lansing (1998),
Baxter and King (1993) and Ambler and Paquet (1996), where they introduced
7As in the case of the utility function of the households, the production function must have
some properties: to be strictly increasing (FK > 0 and FL > 0); to be strictly concave (FKK < 0
and FLL < 0); and to be twice differentiable. It is also assumed that the production function
has constant returns to scale, F (zKt, zLt) = zYt. Still, this function must fulfill the calls Inada
conditions: limK→0 =∞; limK→∞ = 0; limL→0 =∞; and limL→∞ = 0.
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the stock of public capital in the production function. So, Kg,t is the stock of pub-
lic capital, α1, α2, α3 are participation of private capital, of labor and of public
capital in the production of good j, respectively 8, e A is the productivity, whose
law of motion is:
logAt = (1− ρA) logAss+ ρA logAt−1 + εA,t (2.26)
where εA,t is exogenous shocks and ρA is autoregressive components of the produc-
tivity shock.
Using the Lagrangian function to solve the previous problem of wholesaler firm:




g,j,t − Yj,t) (2.27)
The first order conditions are:
∂L
∂Lj,t




g,j,t = 0 (2.28)
∂L
∂Kp,j,t




g,j,t = 0 (2.29)




















8It is assumed that firms have constant returns to scale, α1 + α2 + α3 = 1, following Cassou
and Lanzing (1998), corroborated by empirical studies from Aschauer (1989) and Ai and Cassou
(1995).
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Second Step
In the second step, the wholesale firm maximizes its profit by choosing the price
of its good j,
max
Pj,t
Pj,tYj,t −WtLj,t −RtKp,j,t (2.33)









































































substituting (2.34) into (2.30) and (2.31), and knowing that these firms have the




























We can use the equation (2.35) to see how various changes affects the demand for
labor9. It follows at once that a decrease in the real wage rate, W/P , means a
9The same reasoning can be used for private capital.
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higher quantity of labor demanded. When the real cost of hiring workers decrease,
firms expand employment until labor’s marginal product falls by as much as the
decrease in W/P (Barro, 1997).
An upward shift in the schedule for labor’s marginal product leads to a greater
quantity of labor demanded at any given real wage rate. Employment expands
until the marginal product again equals W/P 10.
2.1.2.3 Pricing a la Calvo
The wholesale firm chooses how much to produce in each period, but following
a rule a la Calvo (Calvo, 1983), this is perhaps the most popular pricing model,
that says they fail to choose the price of their good in all periods. At each period
t, a fraction 0 < 1 − θ < 1 of firms are randomly selected and allowed to choose
the price of their good for period t, P ∗j,t. The remaining firms (the ratio θ of firms)
keeps the price of the previous period (Pj,t = Pj,t−1) for the product.












































where Ld is labor demand.



















Since in any period, all firms face the same wages, rentals, and technology, the
cost are the same for all firms. So, substituting these factor demands into the cost


































































The marginal cost represents the cost, relative to each production factor, of ad-
ditional unit of the intermediate goods. Notice, specially, an increase in the pro-
ductivity (A) or/and in the public capital stock (Kg) falls the marginal cost. The
improvement of the marginal cost raises the supply of goods (Yj,t).
The wholesale firm has a probability θ to keep the price of the previous period for
the good and the probability (1 − θ) to choose the price optimally. Once fixing
the price in period t, there is the probability θ that this price will remain fixed in
period t+1, a probability θ2 that this price will remain fixed in period t+2, and
so on. This firm should take into account these probabilities when choosing the
price of its own good in it capacity to perform this adjustment.








P ∗j,tYj,t+i −Rt+iKj,t+i −Wt+iLj,t+i
]
(2.40)
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where θ is the factor of rigidity in the adjustment of prices and P ∗j,t is the optimal
price set by the firm with the ability to adjust the price of your product. Equation
(2.40) is the discounted profit of the firm during the period which the price P ∗j,t is
in progress.































































Combining the pricing rule of equation (2.23), and the assumption that all firms
with the ability to adjust define equal value and that firms without this ability
retains the same price, the overall price level is obtained by the equation:
Pt =
[
θP 1−ϕt−1 + (1− θ)P ∗t 1−ϕ
] 1
1−ϕ (2.42)
Dividing both sides by Pt−1,
πt =
[






where π = Pt
Pt−1
is the gross inflation rate between t-1 and t. Notice that, as
shown below, all firms will choose the same price because they face an identical
problem. It follows from (2.43) that in a steady state with zero inflation (π = 1),
P ∗t = Pt−1 = Pt for all t.
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The combination of the equations (2.41) and (2.43) result in the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (see Roberts 1995 and 1997; Clarida et al., 1999; McCallum and
Nelson, 1999; Svensson and Woodford, 2003 and 2004; Woodford, 2003; Giannoni
and Woodford, 2005). Briefly, inflation will increase if marginal cost rise.
2.1.3 Government
In this section, we introduce government into our model. The principal role of
governments is to provide public goods and services. These expenditures must
be paid for. This can be achieved through taxation or by borrowing11. Other
objective of the government is to keep price stability. It is reached using monetary
policy. Hence, the government sector in this work is divided into two subsectors:
Fiscal Authority and Monetary Authority.
2.1.3.1 Fiscal Authority
The government collects taxes and issues bonds to finance its spending on goods
and services. Therefore, the change in public debt is given by the following rule:
Bt+1
RIStRBt
−Bt = TSt − TAXt (2.44)
where TS and TAX are total spending and tax revenue of the government, re-
spectively.
As could not be otherwise, the total spending of the government is sensitive to the
size of the public debt (current debt (Bt) relative to its steady-state level, Bss).
In other words, government total spending has an automatic stabilizing property
(Lim and McNelis, 2008):
TSt − TSss = χ(Bt −Bss) (2.45)
11In reality, printing money is possible, but this work doesn’t has money.
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where χ is the sensitivity of government total spending relative to the size of the
public debt.
The government total spending is obtained by:
TSt = GtPt + Ig,tPt + TRANSt (2.46)
where G, Ig,t and TRANS are current expenditures, public investments and trans-
fers of income, respectively.










t = (1− ρIg) logSIgss + ρIg logS
Ig






logSTrt = (1− ρTr) logSTrss + ρTr logSTrt−1 + εTr,t (2.52)
where εG,t, εIg ,t and εTr,t are exogenous shocks, and ρG, ρIg and ρTr are autore-
gressive components of the current expenditures, of the public investments and of
the transfers of income, respectively.
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The stock of public capital follows the following law of motion:
Kg,t+1 = (1− δg)Kg,t + Ig,t (2.53)













The Central Bank of Brazil appears in this work following a simple Taylor rule
(1993) with the dual goal of output growth and maintenance of price stability.
Here, we are considering a variant of the work made by Lim and McNelis (2008).
RBt = ηR
B
t−1 + (1− η)
[
a(Yt − Yss) + b(πt − πss) +RBssSMt
]
(2.55)
where SMt is monetary shock, η is smoothing parameter, and it allows lagged in-
terest rates play a significant role in the determination of the current interest rate,
(a) and (b) are the sensitivities of the basic interest rate in relation to the product
and to the inflation rate, respectively.
logSMt = (1− ρM) logSMss + ρMSMt−1 + εM,t (2.56)
where εM,t and ρM are exogenous shocks and autoregressive components of the
monetary authority.
2.1.4 Equilibrium Condition of Goods Market
To complete the model it is necessary to use the equilibrium condition in the goods
market. Wherein aggregate production Yt is demanded by households (Ct and It)
Chapter 2. DSGE Model 24
and Government (Gt):
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (2.57)
2.2 Steady State
Once obtained the economic equilibrium, the next step is to define the values of
the steady state. In fact, the model is stationary, in the sense that there is a value
for the variables sustained intertemporally. Thus, an endogenous variable xt will
be in steady state for all t, if Etxt+1 = xt = xt−1 = xss.
Some endogenous variables have their values previously determined at steady state.
That is, the variables involved in exogenous shocks. The next step to calculate
the steady state is to remove the time indicators of the variables. Therefore, the
structural model becomes:
From (2.3),






















































































































= TSss − TAXss (2.69)
From (2.46),
TSss = GssPss + Ig,ssPss + TRANSss (2.70)
From (2.47),
Gss = ξGYss (2.71)
From (2.49),
Ig,ss = ξIgYss (2.72)
From (2.51),
TRANSss = ξTrYssPss (2.73)
From (2.53),
Ig,ss = δgKg,ss (2.74)
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From (2.54),
TAXss = τcPss(Css + Ip,ss) + τlWssLss + τkRssKp,ss (2.75)
From (2.57),
Yss = Css + Iss +Gss (2.76)































Kp,ss = A1Yss (2.78)




























Lss = A2Yss (2.80)
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Substituting (2.78) into (2.58),
Ip,ss = δpA1Yss (2.82)
Combining (2.72), (2.82) and (2.62),
Iss =
[
(1− ωG)δpA1 + ωGξIg
]
Yss (2.83)
Substituting (2.71) and (2.83) into (2.63),
Yss = Css +
[













(1− ωG)δpA1 + ωGξIg + ξG
]
Css = A3Yss (2.84)
















Substituting (2.71), (2.72), (2.73) into (2.70),
TSss = (ξG + ξIg + ξTr)YssPss (2.86)
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Substituting (2.64), (2.65), (2.80) and (2.84) into (2.75),
TAXss =
[

















TAXss = A4PssYss (2.87)
Substituting (2.86), (2.87) into (2.69), and assuming Bss
Yss
= 112,
(β − 1) =
[





(ξG + ξIg + ξTr)− A4
(2.88)
2.3 Log-linearization - (Uhlig’s Method)
The conditions for optimizing the model forms a system of nonlinear difference
equations. This system has not a closed analytic solution, generally. In most
cases, it is easier and more convenient to use approximations to characterize the
solution of the dynamic model (Fernandez-Villaverde, 2009). This section sum-
marizes the method of log-linear approximation customarily used in the literature.
Uhlig (1999) recommends a simple method of log-linearization of functions that
do not require differentiation. Thus, consider a set of variables Xt and setting
X̃t = lnXt − lnXss. Then we can write the original variables as: Xt = XsseX̃t .
Uhlig also proposes the following block of aid for the log-linearization:
e(X̃t+aỸt) ≈ 1 + X̃t + aỸt
12Castro et al, (2011) assuming By = 2 (Net government debt-to-GDP ratio (quarterly GDP))



























σ(C̃t+1 − C̃t) + π̃t+1
]



































t−1 + εsl,t (2.95)












t−1 + εk,t (2.98)
From (2.19),
R̃ISt = ρRR̃ISt−1 + εR,t (2.99)
From (2.25),
Ỹt = Ãt + α1K̃p,t + α2L̃t + α3K̃g,t (2.100)
From (2.26),
Ãt = ρAÃt−1 + εA,t (2.101)
From (2.35),
W̃t − P̃t = Ỹt − L̃t (2.102)
From (2.36),
R̃t − P̃t = Ỹt − K̃p,t (2.103)
From (2.39),
(α1 + α2)M̃Ct = α2W̃t + α1R̃t + α3Ỹt − Ãt − α3K̃g,t (2.104)
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From (2.41) e (2.42),
Log-linearizing the equation(2.41),



















P̃t = θP̃t−1 + (1− θ)P̃ ∗t (2.106)
Substituting (2.105) into (2.106),




Multiplying both sides of equation (2.107) by (1 − βθL−1), knowing that LXt =
Xt−1 and Xt+1 = L
−1Xt,








P̃t − βθEtP̃t+1 = θP̃t−1 − βθθP̃t + (1− θ)(1− βθ)M̃Ct




π̃t = βEtπ̃t+1 +
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ





(B̃t+1 − R̃ISt − R̃Bt )−BssB̃t = TSssT̃ St − TAXssT̃AX t (2.109)
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From (2.45),
TSssT̃ St = χBssB̃t (2.110)
From (2.46),
















t = ρIg S̃
Ig
t−1 + εIg ,t (2.115)
From (2.51),




t−1 + εG,t (2.117)
From (2.53),
Kg,ssK̃g,t+1 = (1− δg)Kp,ssK̃g,t + Ig,ssĨg,t (2.118)
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From (2.54),
TAXssT̃AX t = τcPss
[
Css(P̃t + C̃t − φ̃ct) + Iss(P̃t + Ĩtφ̃ct)
]








t−1(1− η)(aYssỸt + bπssπ̃t +RBssS̃Mt ) (2.120)
From (2.56),
S̃Mt = ρM S̃
M
t−1 + εM,t (2.121)
From (2.57),




In this chapter, we will be to parametrize the model economy, i.e., numerical values
must be assigned to the parameters. Often, we have two alternatives: to estimate
the parameters using some econometric technique or to calibrate the parameters.
Calibration involves to calculate the value of the parameters in some way. On the
other hand, the estimation approach, via maximum likelihood or Bayesian meth-
ods, is rather more complex and consists in adjusting the model to the observed
data in order to determine the parameter values. The latter method has recently
been gaining preference among macroeconomists.
Bayesian analysis differs substantially from the classical one. In classical analysis
the probability of an event is the limit of the relative frequency of that event.
Moreover, the parameters of a model are treated as fixed, unknown quantities. In
this framework, unbiased estimators are important because the average value of
the sample estimator converges to the true value via some Law of Large Numbers.
Also, minimum variance estimators are preferable because they yield values closer
to the true parameter. Finally, estimators and tests are evaluated in repeated
samples since this insures that they give correct results with high probability.
Bayesian analysis takes a different point of view on all these issues. Probabilities
measure the level of beliefs that a researcher has in an event. Parameters are ran-
dom variables with a probability distribution. Properties of estimators and tests
34
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in repeated samples are uninteresting since beliefs are not necessarily related to
the relative frequency of an event in large number of hypothetical experiments.
Finally, estimators are chosen to minimize expected loss function (with expecta-
tions taken with respect to the posterior distribution), conditional on the data.
In general, regarding the use of classical econometric approach to macroeconomic
general equilibrium models, Bayesian econometrics has some important advan-
tages, such as: i) it is a flexible way to introduce a prior information about the
structure of the data; ii) because that its procedure is based on the likelihood
function, it is possible to take advantage of all the constraints resulting from a
general equilibrium model.
In addition to this introductory section, this chapter is structured as follows. It
begins with a description of the data used in the estimation of the parameters of
the standard deviations of the stochastic shocks. Then it shows the calibrated pa-
rameters, prior and posterior of the parameters to Bayesian estimation. Finishing
with estimation, which it was run on the Dynare platform 1
3.1 Data
We estimated the model using quarterly data spanning from 2003Q1 to 2013Q4
(44 data points). We use 11 model variables as observables (P , TRANS, Ig, RTL,
RTKp, RTC2, RB, I, G, C and L) which they are described in the Table 3.1. We
have chosen this set of observables taking into account data availability and their
1Dynare is a software platform for the treatment of a wide class of macroeconomic models, in
particular models of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) and Overlapping Gener-
ations (OLG). The models solved by Dynare include the rational expectations hypothesis, but
Dynare is also able to handle models where expectations are formed differently: on one extreme,
models where agents perfectly anticipate the future; at the other extreme, the models where the
agents have limited rationality or imperfect knowledge and thus form their expectations through
a learning process. In terms of types of agents, it is possible to incorporate in Dynare: consumers,
productive enterprises, government, monetary authorities, investors and financial intermediaries.
Some level of heterogeneity can be achieved by the inclusion of several different classes of agents
in each of the categories of the listed agents (Adjemian et al., 2011).
2RTL = τlWL, RTKp = τkRKp and RTC = τc(C + Ip).
where RTL, RTKp and RTC are revenues from the taxes on labor income, on private capital
income and on consumption.
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relevance to the objective of this work. Furthermore, a large set of observables
reduces the problem of identification.
DSGE models are designed to characterize a stationary economy: the stochastic
behavior of the variables is in the form of temporary departures from steady state
values. Corresponding data are represented analogously. DeJong and Dave (2008)
explain the need seasonal adjustment and removing trend by means of an example
of a business cycle model which is proposed to characterize patterns of fluctuations
in the data that recur at business cycle frequencies: between approximately 6 and
40 quarters. It not intended to characterize seasonal fluctuations. Yet unless addi-
tional steps are taken, the removal of the trend will leave such fluctuations intact,
and their presence can have a detrimental impact on inferences involving business
cycle behavior.
Consider the observations Zt, t = 1, ..., N of a time series. Notice that the decom-
position of a series consists to write Zt as a sum of three unobservable components,
Zt = Tt + St + at (3.1)
where Tt and St represent the trend and seasonality, respectively, while at is a
random component with zero mean and constant variance σ2a. So we can think at
as a stationary process. It follows that Zt is in general a non-stationary series.
To seasonality adjustment, the main interest in considering a model of type (3.1),
it will estimate St and build a free series of seasonality. That is, if Ŝt for an esti-
mated St,
ZSAt = Zt − Ŝt (3.2)
it will be a seasonally adjusted.
There is no one right way to detrend a time series. The question is not one of
right or wrong, but of useful or not useful (Hoover, 2012). Constant trends cor-
respond to an equation with fixed coefficients, and include linear an exponential
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trends. If we believe that, despite cyclical fluctuations, the average growth rate
of a series does not change much over a long period, then it reasonable to assume
that the trend has a constant rate of growth and can be described by an equation
T = a(1 + b)t or T = a exp(bt) where t is time, and a and b are constants. If
the time series grows at a steady proportionate rate, the trend is then described
by a linear function T = a+bt. Other detrend way is to use moving-average trends.
These methods truly decompose the trend and the cycle into separate parts. Some-
times we may not really care about the trend but just want to focus on fluctuations.




. Estimating Tt and St and subtracting them from Zt we obtain an
estimate of the random component at.
So, to prepare the data for the model estimation, we deflated using the IPCA,
detrented and seasonally adjusted non stationary series using the software X12-
ARIMA3 and applied first log-difference4. Figure 3.1 provides the graphs of the
series after being transformed.
Table 3.1: Observables variables of the model.
Variable Series Source
P Series constructed using the IPCA (%a.m.) IBGE/SNIPC
TRANS Benef́ıcios assistenciais (LOAS e RMV) R$ (milhões) Min. Fazenda/STN
Ig Custeio e investimento - R$ (milhões) Min. Fazenda/STN
RTL IR - pessoas f́ısicas R$ (milhões) Min. Fazenda/SRF
RTKp IR - pessoas juŕıdicas R$ (milhões) Min. Fazenda/SRF
RTC ICMS and IPI R$ (milhões) Min. Fazenda/SRF
RB Selic Over (% a.m.) BCB Boletim/M. Finan.
I Capital - formação bruta - R$ (milhões) IBGE/SCN 2000 Trim.
G Consumo final - adm. pública - R$ (milhões) IBGE/SCN 2000 Trim.
C Consumo final - famı́lias - R$ (milhões) IBGE/SCN 2000 Trim.
L Horas pagas - indústria - ı́ndice (média 2006 = 100)-SP Fiesp
3X12-ARIMA was developed by US Census Bureau as an extended and improved version of
the X11- ARIMA method of Statistics Canada. The program runs through the following steps.
First the series is modified by any user-defined prior adjustments. Then the program fits a
regARIMA model to the series in order to detect and adjust for outliers and other distorting
effects for improving forecasts and seasonal adjustment. The program then uses a series of
moving averages to decompose a time series into three components. In the last step a wider
range of diagnostic statistics are produced, describing the final seasonal adjustment, and giving
pointers to possible improvements which could be made.
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Figure 3.1: Data series (after transformation).
Source: Prepared by the author.
3.2 Calibrated Parameters and Prior Values
The parameters that are not directly related to the objective of this work were
calibrated, while those relevant parameters in the analysis of the propagation of
shocks were estimated using the Bayesian methodology. The main calibration
procedure adopted here is to obtain the values of parameters from other relevant
DSGE work in the literature.
Cavalcanti and Vereda (2010) analyzed the dynamic properties of a DSGE model
for Brazil under alternative parameterizations. Therefore, they identified ’allow-
able ranges’ of values for some of the key parameters in the literature. Using the
results of these authors, it was decided to use the parameters in common between
the two studies, which were the discount factor (β); the rate of capital deprecia-
tion (δp)(using the same value to rate of public depreciation (δg)); the coefficient
of relative risk aversion (σ); and the marginal disutility of labor (ψ).
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For parameters related to the monetary side, the sensitivities of the basic interest
rate on the product (a) and on the inflation rate (b) plus the interest smoothig
parameter (η) were obtained from Castro et al (2011). Finally, the parameters
related to the structure of the firms were calibrated from two studies. The shares
of private capital (α1), of labor (α2) and of public capital (α3) in output were
obtained from Mussolini (2011) while the index of price stickiness (θ) and the
elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods (ϕ) was obtained from Lim
and McNelis (2008). Table 3.2 summarizes the calibration of the parameters.
Table 3.2: Calibration of the Parameters.
Parameters Value Source
β 0,985 Cavalcanti and Vereda (2010)
δ 0,025 Cavalcanti and Vereda (2010)
σ 2 Cavalcanti and Vereda (2010)
ψ 1,5 Cavalcanti and Vereda (2010)
a 0,16 Castro et al (2011)
b 2,43 Castro et al (2011)
η 0,79 Castro et al (2011)
α1 0,32 Mussolini (2011)
α2 0,6 Mussolini (2011)
α3 0,08 Mussolini (2011)
θ 0,85 Lim and McNelis (2008)
ϕ 6 Lim and McNelis (2008)
The prior values were obtained follows. The parameters related to taxation were
obtained from Araújo and Ferreira (1999). The procedure adopted by these au-
thors was to find the share of each type of tax to GDP and the ratio of the
related variable with the tax to GDP. For the tax rate on consumption (τc),
τcC = 0, 1282Y , with C/Y = 0, 8045, resulting in τc = 0, 1594. For the tax rate
on capital income (τk), τkRK = 0, 0399Y , with R = 0, 1647 and K/Y = 2, 98,
obtaining τk = 0, 0813. For the tax rate on labor income (τl), τlWL = 0, 0881,
with WL/Y = 0, 5092, finding τl = 0, 1730. And the sensitivity of government
spending relative to public debt (χ) was obtained from Lim e McNelis (2008).
We used the series Benef́ıcios Assistenciais (LOAS e RMV), Custeio e Investi-
mento, Consumo Final - Adm. Pública and PIB - Preços de Mercado to calculate
the parameters values of ωG, ξg, ξIg and ξTr using the relationship Ig/I = 0, 42,
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G/Y = 0, 2, Ig/Y = 0, 05 and TRANS/Y = 0, 007, respectively. The autoregres-
sive components (ρR, ρA, ρsc, ρsl, ρc, ρl, ρk, ρM , ρG, ρIg and ρTr) and exogenous
shocks (εR, εA, εsc, εsl, εc, εl, εk, εM , εG, εIg and εTr) were got of the procedure
from Castro et al (2011)5, but for reason of identification, the values of εl and εk
were changed. Table 3.3 summarizes the prior distribution of the model.
Table 3.3: Prior distribution of the model.
Parameters Distribution Average Standard Deviation Source
τc gamma 0,1594 0,05 Araújo and Ferreira (1999)
τk gamma 0,0813 0,04 Araújo and Ferreira (1999)
τl gamma 0,1730 0,05 Araújo and Ferreira (1999)
χ beta 0,1 0,05 Lim and McNelis (2008)
ωG beta 0,42 0,04 Author
ξg beta 0,2 0,015 Author
ξIg beta 0,05 0,005 Author
ξTr beta 0,007 0,002 Author
ρA beta 0,5 0,1 Castro et al (2011)
ρsc beta 0,5 0,1 Castro et al (2011)
ρsl beta 0,5 0,1 Castro et al (2011)
ρc beta 0,5 0,1 Castro et al (2011)
ρl beta 0,5 0,1 Castro et al (2011)
ρk beta 0,5 0,1 Castro et al (2011)
ρG beta 0,5 0,1 Castro et al (2011)
ρIg beta 0,5 0,1 Castro et al (2011)
ρTr beta 0,5 0,1 Castro et al (2011)
ρR beta 0,5 0,1 Castro et al (2011)
ρM beta 0,5 0,1 Castro et al (2011)
εA invgamma 1 inf Castro et al (2011)
εsc invgamma 1 inf Castro et al (2011)
εsl invgamma 1 inf Castro et al (2011)





εG invgamma 1 inf Castro et al (2011)
εIg invgamma 1 inf Castro et al (2011)
εTr invgamma 1 inf Castro et al (2011)
εR invgamma 1 inf Castro et al (2011)
εM invgamma 1 inf Castro et al (2011)
Due to criterion of identification.
3.2.1 Identification and Sensitivity
DSGE models consist of a system of non-linear equations involving a vector z
of endogenous variables, a u vector of random structural shocks and a θ ⊂ Θ
k-dimensional vector of deep parameters. Most applications use a linear approx-
imation of the original model, i.e. expressing the model in terms of stationary
5Castro et al (2011) chose the same mean value and standard deviation for the autoregressive
component and for the stochastic shocks.
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variables linearized around their steady-states. The unique solution (if it exists),
can be expressed as
zt = A(θ)zt−1 + B(θ)ut (3.3)
where A and B are functions of θ. For later use, and using Iskrev (2010) notation,
denote τ as a vector collecting all the reduced-form coefficients from the DSGE
model, i.e. the elements in A, Ω = BB’ and the steady-state of zt that depend on
θ, respectively τ = [τz, τA, τΩ].
A condition for identification is that distinct values of θ imply distinct values of the
probability density function of the data, as the latter contains all available sample
information about the value of the parameter vector of interest θ. Usually, the
distribution of the data X is unknown or assumed to be Gaussian and estimation
of θ is based on the first moments of the data. If X is not normally distributed,
higher-order moments may provide additional information about θ, not contained
in the first two moments. Define mT:= [µ′, σ′T ] as the vector collecting the first
and second order moments of the observable variables. Identification based on the
mean and the variance of X is only sufficient but not necessary for identification
with the complete distribution, so that the mapping from the population moments
of the sample, mT, to θ is unique.
Global identification cannot, in general, be established for unique solutions of sys-
tems of non-linear equations, but local identification can be verified by means of
a rank condition of the Jacobian matrix JT =
∂mT
∂θ′
. Indeed, θ0 is said to be locally
identified if JT has full column rank when evaluated at θ0, although this does
not guarantee that the model is locally identified everywhere in the parameter
space. However, studying the rank of JT is helpful, as local identifiability ensures
consistent estimation of the parameters of interest, and, moreover, it will help to
pinpoint the parameters that cause identification problems. For example, the col-
umn of JT corresponding to an unidentified parameter θj will be a vector of zeros
and the rank condition will fail. Another possibility may occur when the columns
of JT are not linearly independent, due to parameters entering the solution in a
way that makes them indistinguishable (partial identification).
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While numerical differentiation could be used to obtain JT , this is unreliable when
the model is highly non-linear. Instead, Iskrev (2010) proposes using analytical
derivatives, employing implicit derivation, breaking down the mapping from θ to
mT in two steps: i) a transformation of θ to τ , ii) a transformation from τ to







The first term J1 =
∂mT
∂τ ′
may be obtained by direct differentiation. Regarding
the second term, Iskrev (2010) establishes a necessary condition for identification:
the point θ0 is locally identifiable only if the rank of HT =
∂τ ′
∂θ
evaluated at θ0 is
equal to k. The second term can be split into the three components of τ . Note
that HT does not depend on the data, thus implying that it is possible to detect
lack of identification, inherent to the structure of the DSGE model, before taking
the model to the data. On the other hand, the rank of JT will provide informa-
tion on the identification θ given the set of observable variables and the sample size.
The above suggests a procedure based on Monte Carlo exploration of the parameter
space Θ of model parameters. One starts by constructing a sample of draw from
Θ (discarding values that do not ensure stability and determinacy). This step
can be guided by use of priors, specifying a theoretically admissible range and/or
a particular distribution for θ. The identifiability of each draw for θj is then
established by studying the rank of JT and HT , resorting to the necessary and
sufficient conditions enumerated in Iskrev (2010):
• if HT is rank-deficient at θj, this particular point is unidentifiable (full rank
of HT is necessary for identification)
• if HT full rank but JT does not, the θj cannot be identified for the par-
ticular set of observables and contemporaneous and lagged moments under
consideration, i.e. given X and T
• weak identification issues when the columns of JT and HT are nearly linearly
dependent (multicollinearity analysis of the re-scalet Jacobians)
Thus, a given parameter θj may be poorly identified because it has little impact
on the reduced-from coefficients of the model ( ∂τ
∂θj
≈ 0 or because its impact on
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The ’point estimate’ mode is the default option in Dynare, in which local iden-
tification checks are done for the whole set, or only a subset, of the parameters
in the model at a chosen central tendency measure, either at the defined prior
or the estimated posterior, or at the calibrated value if no prior is declared. If
priors have been defined, a Monte Carlo exploration is also available, in which the
identification checks are based on samples from the prior distribution.
The result of identification procedure then reveals whether or not there are iden-
tification problems, stemming from JT and/or HT , as illustrated below for the
model of this work (Box 3.1):
==== Identification analysis ====
Testing prior mean
All parameters are identified in the model (rank of H).
All parameters are identified by J moments (rank of J)
==== Identification analysis completed ====
BOX 3.1: Result of the Identification analysis
If the rank condition fails, the procedure indicates which parameters are responsi-
ble for identification problems. The result of identification analysis this work (Box
3.1) indicates that all parameters are identified in the model.
A further output of the identification routine of the Dynare is the analysis of
identifications ’strengh’, i.e., focusing on weak identification, summarized in two
additional plots. The procedures are based on either the asymptotic or moments
information matrix. The first can be obtained given a sample of size T, whereas
the second can be computed based on Monte Carlo simulations for samples of size
T, from which sample moments of the observed variables are computed, forming a
sample of N replicas of simulated moments. The corresponding information matrix






is the covariance matrix
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of simulated moments.








which works like a t-test for θi. This can be decomposed into a ’sensitivity’ and
’correlation’ parts, the first referring to the case when weak identification arises
when the moments do not change with θ, and the second when colinearity damp-
ens the effect of θi. The latter is defined as
si =
√
θ2i IT (θ)(i,i) (3.6)
Thus, the identification in the Dynare plots the measures described above (also
normalized relative to the prior standard deviation for θi), where large bars imply
strong identification, while low bars signal potential weak identification for the
respective θi. The Figure 3.2 shows the identification in the moments for the this
work model. The result was quite good, but the parameters ρk, εk, ρc and εc have
weak identification. The main result of the identification analysis was to demon-
strate that all fiscal variables (which is the object of study of this thesis: τc, τk,
τl, χ , ωG, ξg, ξIg and ξTr) have strong identification.
3.3 Bayesian Methodology
The information that we have about a quantity of interest θ is fundamental in
the statistic. The true value of θ is unknown and the idea is to try to reduce
this issue. Furthermore, the intensity of uncertainty about θ can assume different
levels. Bayesian point of view, these different levels of uncertainty is represented
using probabilistic Models. In this context, it is natural that different researchers
may have different levels of uncertainty (specifying different models). Thus, there
is not distinction between observable quantities and the parameters of a statistical
model, all are considered random quantities.
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Figure 3.2: Identification strength.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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3.3.1 Bayes Theorem
Consider an unknown amount of interest θ (typically unobservable). The informa-
tion we have about θ, summarized probabilistically by p(θ), it can be enhanced by
observing a random amount X related with θ. The sampling distribution p(x|θ)
defines this relationship. The idea that after observing X = x the amount of
information about θ increases is quite intuitive and Bayes’ theorem is the update
rule used to quantify this increase in information,









Note that 1/p(x) does not depend of θ, works as a normalizing constant p(θ|x).
For a fixed value of x, the function l(θ;x) = p(x|θ) provides the likelihood of
each of the possible values of θ while p(θ) is called as the a prior distribution of
θ. These two sources of information, prior and likelihood are combined leading
to the posterior distribution of θ, p(θ|x). Thus, the usual form of Bayes’ theorem is
p(θ|x) ∝ l(θ;x)p(θ) (3.8)
Note that by omitting the term p(x), the equality in (3.7) is replaced by a propor-
tionality. This simplified form of Bayes’ theorem is useful in problems involving
parameter estimation since the denominator is just a normalizing constant.
3.3.2 Monte Carlo Markov Chain
Methods of Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) are an alternative to non-
iterative methods for complex problems. The idea is to obtain a sample from
the posterior distribution and calculate sample estimates of characteristics of this
distribution. The difference is that here we use an iterative simulation techniques,
based on Markov chains, and thus the generated values will no longer be indepen-
dent.
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3.3.2.1 Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm
The Metropolis-Hastings algorithms use the same idea of the methods of rejection,
i.e. a value is generated from an auxiliary distribution and accepted with a given
probability. This correction mechanism ensures the convergence of the chain to
the equilibrium distribution, which in this case is the posterior distribution.
Suppose that the chain is in the state θ and a value of θ′ is generated from a
proposal distribution q(•|θ). Note that the proposal distribution can depend on
the current state of the chain, for example q(•|θ) could be a normal distribution
distribution centered in θ. The new value θ′ is accepted with probability







where π is the distribution of interest.
An important feature is that you only need to know π partially. This is critical
in Bayesian applications where we do not know fully the posterior. Note also that
the chain can remain in the same state for many iterations and in practice it is
customary to monitor this by calculating the average percentage of iterations for
which new values are accepted.
In practical terms, the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm can be specified by the fol-
lowing steps (Figure 3.3),
1. Initialize the iteration counter t = 0 and specify an initial value θ0.
2. Generate a new value θ′ of the distribution q(•|θ).
3. Calculate the probability of acceptance α(θ, θ′) and generate u ∼ U(0, 1).
4. Whether u ≤ α then it accepts the new value and then θ(t+1) = θ′, otherwise
reject and do θ(t+1) = θ.
5. Increment the counter of t to t+ 1 and return to step 2.
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Although the distribution proposal can be chosen arbitrarily in practice must take
some care to ensure the efficiency of the algorithm. In Bayesian applications the
distribution of interest is itself a posterior, i.e. π = p(θ|x) and the probability of
acceptance takes a particular form,











Figure 3.3: Bayesian Estimation Process.
Source: Prepared by the author.
3.4 Estimation Results
We used the Dynare program for estimation. Posterior distributions for the pa-
rameters were computed using the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm, which relies on
the Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) procedure. This section shows the test-
ing for convergence of MCMC and de posterior values.
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3.4.1 Testing for Convergence of MCMC
Testing for convergence of the posterior distribution is notoriously difficult. Monte
Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) univariate diagnostic is the main source of feed-
back to gain confidence, or spot a problem, with results (Griffoli, 2011). For
this test, Dynare utilizes some indicative statistics, summarized by diagrams, as
recommended by Brooks and Gelman (1998). These diagrams are made up of:
• Three multivariate figures, representing convergence indicators for all pa-
rameters considered together
• Three figures for each parameter, representing univariate convergence indi-
cators
The basic univariate test is motivated by standard Analysis of Variance Consider-
ations. Suppose we generate m MCMC chains that are each run for 2n iterations,
of which the first n are discarded to avoid the burn-in period. Consider a partic-
ular scalar summary ϕ of the draws ϕjk, j = 1, ...,m, k = 1, ..., n, where ϕ would
typically be one the parameters θi. It is then a standard result that if the ϕjk







(ϕjk − ϕ..)2 ≡
n∑
k=1




where j. represents the mean for the jth chain, and ϕ.. is the mean over all chains.
One measure of convergence is that the . are all equal to ϕ.. i.e. that the initial
value of the draw in each chain has not affected the mean. Another test is whether
the variance is equal across all the chains. An obvious way of testing both of these

















(ϕjk − ϕj.)2 (3.13)
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Brooks and Gelman (1998) recommend that V and W are plotted sequentially for
k = 1, ..., n; this means that one can check that as n increases, V and W tend
individually to a limit, and that this is the same limit as k approaches n. If the
posterior distribution is unimodal, this is essentially a check that both means and
variances of all chains’ estimates of ϕ are tending to the same limit. If the pos-
terior distribution is not unimodal, then it makes sense to extend this to other
















k=1 |ϕjk − ϕj.|2
(3.14)
One can extend this to the multivariate case, so that analogously to (3.11) we







(ϕjk − ϕ..)(ϕjk − ϕ..)T ≡
n∑
k=1




(ϕj.− ϕ..)(ϕj.− ϕ..)T (3.15)
Matrices V and W are the defined analogously to their scalar versions above. One









should tent to 1 if the chains are converging to the posterior distribution.
Another multivariate measure involves monitoring the determinants of V and W,
and also the corresponding determinants for other moments e.g. the third mo-
ment, as in the univariate case.
Another measure recommended by Brooks and Gelman (1998) is an interval mea-
sure. This is based on the intuitive notion that R2 also represents a squared ratio
of the proportion of draws within a certain confidence interval. To perform this
explicity, Brooks and Gelman (1998) suggest a measure Rinterval that uses, as be-
fore, the last n of the 2n draws of each chain, and then
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1. From each chain find the empirical 100(1 − α)% interval i.e. the number









α = 0, 2.
2. Do the same for all the mn draws from all the m chains.
3. Evaluate Rinterval ≡ VintervalWinterval where Vinterval=length of total-sequence inter-
val, Winterval=mean length of within-sequence intervals. As before, it is
insightful to plot both Vinterval and Winterval.
This can be extended to the multivariate case; here we count the number of draws
for which each of the elements θi of the vector θ lie within their individual empir-
ical 100(1− α)% intervals.
Reading this diagnostics, if the results from one chain are sensible, and the opti-
mizer did not get stuck in an odd are or the parameter subspace, two things should
happen. First, results within any of the however many iterations of Metropolis-
Hastings simulation should similar. And second, results between the various chains
should be close. More specifically, the red and blue lines on the charts represent
specific measures of the parameter vector both within and between chains. For
the results to be sensible, these should be relatively constant (although there will
always be some variation) and they should converge (Griffoli, 2011).
Considering the result of this test for our model. The multivariate diagnostics
(Figure 3.4) indicates that the chains have converged to similar means and distri-
butions. However, examining the individual parameters (Figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7),
the results is somewhat mixed.
In general, the parameters converge, especially in relation to the ’interval’ (e.g.
τc, τk and χ). On the other hand, the parameters of stochastic shocks and the
autoregressive components presented the greatest variation during the process of
convergence, especially εl, εk, εsc, εsl, ρsl and ρl. This less satisfactory perfor-
mance for the estimation of these parameters is related to prior values of each.
This feature was already noticed in Figure 3.2, which these components showed
weak identification. Even realizing that lower performance in the estimation of
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Figure 3.4: Multivariate MCMC Diagnostics for the model.
Source: Prepared by the author.
these parameters, we decided not to change their prior values. Because we con-
sider the general result satisfactory, without any prejudice to the outcome of the
work.
3.4.2 Posterior Values
Given the prior distributions of the parameters, we estimate the posteriors dis-
tributions using a Markov chain process via Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with
1.000.000 iterations, scale value 0,4 to be used for the jumping distribution and
5 parallel chains for Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. The results of the Bayesian
estimation are shown in Table 3.4 and Figures 3.8 and 3.9.
These graphs are especially relevant and present key results, but they can also
serve as tools to detect problems or build additional confidence in yours results.
First, the prior and the posterior distribution should not be excessively different.
Second, the posterior distributions should be close to normal, or at lest not display
a shape that is clearly non-normal. Third, the green mode should not be too far
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Figure 3.5: Univariate MCMC Diagnostics for the Model for εG, εIg , εTr, εc,
εl, εk, εA, εsc, εsl and εM .
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Figure 3.6: Univariate MCMC Diagnostics for the Model for εR, ωG, τc, τk,
τl, ξg, ξIg, ξTr, χ and ρsc.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Figure 3.7: Univariate MCMC Diagnostics for the Model for ρsl, ρG, ρIg , ρTr,
ρM , ρR, ρc, ρl, ρk and ρA.
Source: Prepared by the author.
Chapter 3. Empirical Implementation 56
Table 3.4: Posterior distribution of the model.
Parameter prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
Fiscal Parameters
ωG 0,42 0,379 0,318 0,4371 beta 0,04
τc 0,159 0,1495 0,1219 0,1767 gamma 0,05
τk 00,081 0,0452 0,0125 0,0767 gamma 0,04
τl 0,173 0,3489 0,2717 0,4535 gamma 0,05
ξg 0,2 0,5328 0,4364 0,6431 beta 0,15
ξIg 0,05 0,0532 0,0445 0,0618 beta 0,005
ξTr 0,007 0,0092 0,0058 0,0126 beta 0,002
χ 0,1 0,1599 0,0545 0,2568 beta 0,05
Autoregressive Components
ρsc 0,5 0,3665 0,2558 0,476 beta 0,1
ρsl 0,5 0,2339 0,1088 0,3401 beta 0,1
ρG 0,5 0,4268 0,2787 0,569 beta 0,1
ρIg 0,5 0,3523 0,2199 0,4805 beta 0,1
ρTr 0,5 0,262 0,1596 0,3635 beta 0,1
ρM 0,5 0,6441 0,5758 0,7142 beta 0,1
ρR 0,5 0,8643 0,8487 0,879 beta 0,1
ρc 0,5 0,4664 0,3089 0,6258 beta 0,1
ρl 0,5 0,8066 0,6662 0,9486 beta 0,1
ρk 0,5 0,4825 0,3297 0,6346 beta 0,1
ρA 0,5 0,4791 0,3367 0,6133 beta 0,1
Exogenous Shocks
εG 1 0,1504 0,1222 0,176 invg Inf
εIg 1 0,5766 0,4288 0,7195 invg Inf
εTr 1 15,7367 9,1234 23,1159 invg Inf
εc 1 0,3044 0,213 0,395 invg Inf
εl 5 2,2033 1,2851 3,3242 invg Inf
εk 5 2,7941 1,2128 4,4605 invg Inf
εA 1 0,1558 0,1248 0,1844 invg Inf
εsc 1 0,5539 0,3549 0,7655 invg Inf
εsl 1 2,1978 0,2811 3,0861 invg Inf
εM 1 0,5123 0,398 0,6242 invg Inf
εR 1 0,2462 0,1977 0,2932 invg Inf
away from the mode of the posterior distribution.
Notice that the overall result was satisfactory. However, we should direct the com-
ments to the most relevant results of this work, which they are related to fiscal
parameters. Thus, note that: ωG, τc, τk, τl, ξIg, ξTr and χ presented great results
(they have normal distributions and their prior values do not differ considerably
from the posteriors), while ξg showed acceptable result (because even with a nor-
mal distribution, the posterior value became distant from the prior). Briefly, none
of the fiscal parameters showed unsatisfactory results.
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Figure 3.8: Priors and posteriors for χ, ρsl, ρG, ρIg , ρTr, ρM , ρR, ρc, ρl, ρk
and ρA.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Figure 3.9: Priors and posteriors for εG, εIg , εTr, εc, εl, εk, εA, εsc, εsl and εM ,
εR, ωG, τc, τk, τl, ξg, ξIg and ξTr.
Source: Prepared by the author.
Chapter 4
Macroeconomics Effects Related
to Composition of Brazilian
Government Spending
Introduction
The public sector in Brazil has experienced considerable expansion over the past
six decades. The available data indicate that between 1948 and 2012, total ex-
penditures of the public sector rose from 17% of GDP in 1948 to 39% in 2013
(IMF, 2014). Some studies on the dynamic behavior of public expenditures have
been conducted. Among them, some highlights are the contributions of Wagner
(Bird, 1970) and Peacock and Wiseman (1970) who established hypotheses that
explain the process of evolution in the public sector. Both studies emphasized the
problem of identifying the determinants of the expansion of government expen-
ditures based on empirical analysis. It is justified to look at the composition of
public expenditures because the public administrator has to choose the types of
expenditures that will probably leave some unsatisfied groups.
Table 4.1 shows the growth of public spending of some developed countries during
the twentieth century. The first reason for the growth in public spending shown
in this table is in the “war effort” that includes the reconstruction of the countries
involved in the two great global conflicts. If the wars were the only cause of the
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increase in the relationship between public spending and GDP, that trend should
have ceased after 1945. Yet, the overall share of the government in the economy
grew significantly after 1960. This means that there were other causes that explain
this phenomenon.
In this sense, the literature on public finance highlights two important causes. The
first is represented by demographic factors associated with the aging of the popu-
lation (that apparently explains the increase in public spending in the economies
shown in Table 4.1). Given that a greater proportion of the population became
older, the total expenditures on health as well as social security grew. The second
cause is urbanization as an explanation for the increase in government spending
in developing countries (however, this does not exactly correlate because for those
countries, this phenomenon predates the period in Table 4.1). Between 1950 and
1980, the percentage of the Brazilian urban population increased from 36% to
68% of the total population. Just as had occurred in the advanced industrialized
countries, this led to a major shift in demand for public spending (Giambiagi and
Além, 2008).
Briefly, it is legitimate for a government to increase spending, but at the same
time from the point of view of anti-inflationary policy, it is desirable that if this
occurs, it is funded through taxes and/or with only a modest increase in public
debt (Giambiagi and Além, 2008). However, Brazil has systematically raised the
size of the government in the economy. Between 1991 and 2011, the ratio of its
primary spending to GDP increased 57,66% (with an annual average of 2,37%
shown in Figure 4.1), starting from 13,7% of GDP in 1991 to 21,6% of GDP in
2011. The excessive size of the Brazilian government is more evident when it is
compared with other countries. Table 4.2 displays the government expenditures
in various developed and developing countries. Among all the countries listed,
Brazil has the thirteenth largest government expenditure in percentage of GDP,
well ahead of developed countries like the United States, Japan and New Zealand.
For countries that make up the BRICS group, Brazil has the highest government
spending at 39%, followed by Russia (35%), South Africa (30%), India (27%) and
China (21%). It is worth noting that the two countries that have exhibited greater
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Table 4.1: Growth of public expenditure in the world (% GDP). Source:
Modified from Giambiagi and Além (2008)
Countries Late nineteenth century Pre-War Post-War
Germany 10 14,8 25
Canada - - 16,7
United States 7,3 7,5 12,1
France 12,6 17 27,6
Netherlands 9,1 9 13,5
Italy 11,9 11,1 22,5
Japan 8,8 8,3 14,8
Norway 5,9 9,3 16
United Kingdom 9,4 12,7 26,2
Sweden 5,7 10,4 10,9
Average 8,97 11,12 18,53
Countries Pre-Second World War 1960 1980 1990 2002 2012
Germany 34,1 32,4 47,9 45,1 47,95 44,67
Canada 25 28,6 38,8 46 43,39 44,84
United States 19,7 27 31,4 32,8 34,84 38,72
France 29 34,6 46,1 49,8 52,87 56,64
Netherlands 19 33,7 55,8 54,1 46,21 50,17
Italy 24,5 30,1 42,1 53,4 47,12 50,51
Japan 25,4 17,5 32 31,3 36,62 39,9
Norway 11,8 29,9 43,8 54,9 46,38 42,99
United Kingdom 30 32,2 43 39,9 38,08 44,77
Sweden 16,5 31 60,1 59,1 55,6 52,12
Average 23,5 29,7 44,1 46,64 44,906 46,533
Figure 4.1: Primary Government Spending (%GDP).
Source: Secretaria de Poĺıtica Econômica/Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional.
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Table 4.2: Government Expenditures in Various Countries. Expressed as
Ratios to Nominal GDP. Source: IMF(2014)
Country Gover. Expen (Ratios to GDP) Country Gover. Expen (Ratios to GDP)
Paraguay 0,19 New Zealand 0,35
Peru 0,19 Japan 0,37
Chile 0,22 United States 0,38
Mexico 0,24 United Kingdom 0,42
Colombia 0,28 Norway 0,43
Ecuador 0,29 Canada 0,44
Uruguay 0,33 Israel 0,45
Egypt 0,35 Germany 0,46
Argentina 0,37 Portugal 0,47
Turkey 0,37 Netherlands 0,48
China 0,21 Greece 0,48
India 0,27 Italy 0,49
South Africa 0,30 Sweden 0,53
Russia 0,35 France 0,55
Brazil 0,39 Denmark 0,55
economic growth are those with the lowest public spending of the group (China
and India). When comparing Brazil with developing countries, only two countries
have a similar proportion of public spending: Argentina and Turkey, both at 37%.
It is not surprising that the governments of the developed countries have higher
spending as a share of GDP since they are the countries with the highest quality
in the provision of public services (examples include Denmark and Sweden).
Figure 4.2 was designed with the aim of analyzing the behavior of the composi-
tion of public spending in Brazil: current spending, public investment and income
transfers to households. Relationships were made between current spending and
public investment (G/Ig); current spending and income transfers (G/TRANS);
and public investment and income transfers (Ig/TRANS). Notice that the G/-
TRANS and G/Ig relationships have decreased consistently during the entire pe-
riod (2003-2013), with the fall of G/TRANS being most significant. On the other
hand, the behavior of Ig/TRANS has an inflection point in 2008, in the beginning,
it was decreasing and then reversed from that point forward.
In the remaining sections, this chapter presents the relevant literature about dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) modeling of government expendi-
tures. This is followed with the study analysis results that include the variance
decomposition and impulse response functions.
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Figure 4.2: Composition of Brazilian Government Expenditure.
Series: Custeio e Investimento (Proxy to Ig); Benef́ıcios Assistenciais (Proxy to
TRANS); and Consumo final - adm. pública (Proxy to G).
Prepared by the author.
4.1 Literature Review
This section reviews the relevant economic literature on the use of DSGE models in
the study of public spending. Among the models developed for the Brazilian econ-
omy, three “large models” have greater acceptance among Brazilian economists.
The first and most complete is the stochastic analytical model with a Bayesian
approach (SAMBA). Castro et al. (2011) developed this model to be used as part
of the macroeconomic modeling framework of the Central Bank of Brazil. The
model embeds 1) the fiscal authority pursues an explicit target for the primary
surplus-to-GDP ratio, in accordance with the fiscal regime in place since 1999; and
2) the significant part or consumer prices is regulated by the government, following
contract rules.
The SAMBA model also includes two other features that are less usual in DSGE
models but relevant in the case of the Brazilian economy. First, in Brazil and
many other countries with relatively large manufacturing sectors, most imports
are inputs used in the production function rather than being final consumption
goods. So the model treats imports as inputs that are used to produce differen-
tiated sectoral goods. Second, as supported by the data, the model assumes that
a fraction of the imports must be financed abroad so that shocks from external
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financial conditions have an extra channel of transmission into the domestic econ-
omy. Other frictions are wage and sectoral price rigidities, habit persistence in
consumption and non-Ricardian agent and adjustment costs in investments, ex-
ports and imports. Figure 4.3 exhibits the shocks to the government consumption
in the SAMBA model of Castro et al. (2011).
Figure 4.3: Impulse Responses to a Government Consumption Shock to the
SAMBA.
Source: Modified from Castro et al (2011).
This study sought to answer: 1) how does the type of fiscal expenditure matter
for the business cycle?; 2) to what extent can an expansionist shock to the pri-
mary surplus put accomplishment of the Central Bank’s inflation target at risk?;
and 3) has the conduct of fiscal policy in Brazil in recent years put pressure on
inflation? Carvalho and Valli (2011) created another model with great acceptance
among academics working with DSGE in Brazil. These authors introduced that
governments intervene in the economy through the accumulation of public capital
with an impact on factor productivity and in the overall demand for investment
goods.
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Different from this work where the firm does not choose the amount of public cap-
ital that one will use in its production process, Carvalho and Valli (2011) assumed
that firms can selectively choose between public and private capital services. This
modeling choice was intended to capture the significant presence of the Brazil-
ian government in the productive sector of the economy. This model works with
two types of households; the first has more specialized labor services1 where the
second does not. Wages and prices have rigidities but there are still consump-
tion habits. Among the shocks proposed by the authors, there are shocks in the
primary surplus/GDP (Figure 4.4), in the public investments (Figure 4.5) and in
public transfers / GDP (Figure 4.6).
Figure 4.4: Impulse responses to a 1 s.d. shock to the primary surplus/GDP
- Carvalho and Valli model.
Source: Modified from Carvalho and Valli (2011).
1Just a different way of denominating non-Ricardian agents.
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Figure 4.5: Impulse responses to a 1 s.d. shock to public investment - Carvalho
and Valli model.
Source: Modified from Carvalho and Valli (2011).
Completing this set of three “large models”, Vereda and Cavalcanti (2010) devel-
oped a model with the objective of identifying the impact of various shocks on
the evolution of the main macroeconomic variables. It was especially to predict
the effects of changes in the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies, productiv-
ity shocks, terms of trade shocks, foreign interest rate shocks and global growth
shocks. Its structure is supported in the following characteristics: 1) firms with
market power; 2) price and wages rigidities; 3) real frictions such as capital ad-
justment costs, variable capacity utilization and habit formation in consumption;
and 4) non-Ricardian agents.
After reviewing these three large models, it is appropriate to highlight advances in
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Figure 4.6: Impulse responses to a 1 s.d. shock to public transfer/GDP -
Carvalho and Valli model.
Source: Modified from Carvalho and Valli (2011).
small DSGE models to fiscal policy. Mussolini and Teles (2012) developed a model
of business cycles with government and public capital, with the aim of studying
the effects of fiscal shocks on the economic cycle and representing the main stylized
facts of fiscal policy in postwar Brazil. Their results indicated that a real business
cycle (RBC) with public capital and fiscal policy shocks seems to show well these
factors. However, it overstates the volatility of government consumption in the
face of private consumption as it significantly underestimates the variation of the
latter. The authors analyzed four types of shocks, of which three are of interest in
this study: shocks in the income tax, in the government spending on consumption
and in the public investment (Figure 4.7). Therefore, the models developed by
Castro et al (2011), Carvalho and Valli (2011) and Mussolini and Teles (2012)
were used as a kind of benchmark for this study, which justifies the display of
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some results from these works.
Figure 4.7: Impulse response function of the Mussolini and Teles model.
Source: Modified from Mussolini and Teles (2012).
The composition of government spending was studied by Straub and Tchakarov
(2007) who analyzed the macroeconomic effects of the observed change in the com-
position of public spending in the European Union since the 1970s. The model
of these authors includes habits of consumption, adjustment costs in the capital
stock and wage and price frictions. The main result from their study is that both
temporary and permanent increases in public investment generate larger fiscal
multipliers than those from increases in public consumption.
4.2 Results
This chapter is motivated by recent debates about the relative effectiveness of pub-
lic consumption vs. public investment and income transfer as demand management
tools. In particular, the debate has focused on the veracity of the underlying hy-
pothesis that public investment is a relatively more powerful instrument of fiscal
policy than public consumption. Although there is substantial empirical literature
that attempts to identify the sources of these developments, there is still a lack
of understanding of the nature and the impact of a change in the composition of
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public spending.
With the purpose of helping to fill this gap, this study aimed to analyze how three
types of government expenditures affect the main macroeconomic variables. Three
spending shocks in a DSGE model were used. In the first, there is the possibility
of the government stimulating the economy through current spending. In the sec-
ond, the government increases spending on public investments 2. In the third, the
government provides income transfer to households 3.
4.2.1 Variance Decomposition
This section examines the contribution of each shock to the overall variance of
each variable. It provides an initial analysis of the relationships between exoge-
nous stochastic processes and endogenous variables. Table 4.3 and Figure 4.8 show
the decomposition of the error variance for the variables analyzed in this work,
considering only three shocks related to the composition of public spending (εg,
εIg and εTr), which are all objects in the analysis.
In general, the shock in the current government spending (εg) has the greatest
explanatory power in relation to the movements of most of the variables (blue
columns of Figure 4.8). In some instances, the explanatory power exceeds 90%:
product (Y ), 90,37%; household consumption (C), 99,31%; private investment
(Ip ), 98,15%; total investment (I), 99,89%; current government spending (G),
99,86%; labor (L), 99,37%; private capital (Kp), 99%; interest rate (R
B), 97,88%;
inflation rate (π), 92,93% ; and public debt (B), 96,31%.
The other six variables are also explained by this shock; however, this explanation
is shared with the shock in nominal income transfer to households (εTr): wages
2Investment in general refers to the use of capital in production methods to increase produc-
tion capacity. Public investment refers to capital invested by the state to improve the quality of
life of people. For example, there are expenditure on infrastructure such as roads, bridges, hos-
pitals, ports, sanitation and schools that are essential to the economy and growth of a country,
which depend almost exclusively on public investment. Other examples include public invest-
ments in social, urban, transport and productive factors.
3The income transfer programs aim to raise the income of the poor people until some minimum
acceptable level is reached.
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(W ), 25,01%; return of private capital (R), 27,03%; general price level (P ), 25,14%;
total government spending (TS), 11,21%; and total government revenues (TAX),
24,29%. Which are explained by εTr and the respective percentages.
Turning to analysis of the shock in public investment (εIg), notice that four vari-
ables are influenced by it: gross domestic product - GDP (Y ); stock of public
capital (kg); inflation rate (π); and public debt (B). However, the stock of public
capital is the only variable explained by this shock at 90%, and it shoukd not be
otherwise.
Briefly, the analysis of variance decomposition showed that current government
spending, among the compositional elements of public spending, had greater power
to influence changes in the economy.
Table 4.3: Variance decomposition (in percent). Source: Prepared by the
author.
εg εIg εTr
Y 90,37 9,63 0
C 99,31 0,69 0
Ip 98,15 1,85 0
Ig 0,12 99,88 0
I 99,89 0,11 0
G 99,86 0,14 0
L 99,37 0,63 0
Kp 99 1 0
Kg 0,59 99,41 0
W 74,37 0,61 25,01
R 72,32 0,65 27,03
Rb 97,88 2,12 0
P 74,27 0,59 25,14
PI 92,93 7,07 0
Cmg 73,55 0,59 25,86
B 96,31 3,53 0,16
TS 88,5 0,28 11,21
TAX 75,13 0,58 24,29
TRANS 0,26 0 99,74
4.2.2 Analysis of Bayesian Impulse Response Functions
(IRF)
This section presents the impulse response functions as a result of persistent shocks
to the variables of the model. The dark lines show the response of the economy
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Figure 4.8: Variance decomposition (%).
Source: Prepared by the author.
calibrated with the average of the estimated parameter distributions. The gray
area indicates the 10th and 90th percentiles. Thus, this section shows the impor-
tance of shocks to the endogenous variables of interests by analyzing the impulse
response to the structural shocks in the models. The impulse response functions
(IRFs) can be directly related to the reduced-form state space representation of
the economic model. Consider the general state space form equations:
Xt+1 = AXt +Bεt+1 (4.1)
Yt = CXt (4.2)
where Xt is the potentially unobservable state vector and Yt is the vector of the
observables, εt is the vector of economic shocks and measurement errors (where
the latter are included among the state variables Xt) influencing the states and
observables.
The impulse responses from the structural shocks εt to Yt are given by the follow-
ing moving average (MA) representation if the eigenvalues of A are inside the unit
circle:
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j) < +∞, and dj = CAj−1B for j ≥ 0.
Note that equation (4.3) transforms k shocks εt into n observables Yt+j, j ≥ 0.
IRFs are the expected future path of the endogenous variables, conditional on a
shock in period 1 of one-standard-deviation. If a model is linearized up to a first
order in the Dynare software, IRFs are simply the algebraic forward iteration of
the model’s computed decision rule from the state-space form (e.g. Hamilton,
1994). The Dynare software procedure runs an IRF (that starts from the exact
steady state), by sampling shocks from the distribution (with 1 s.d.) to see how
the system reacts for the given periods.
4.2.2.1 Current Government Spending Shock
Here, the study defined the shock in the current government spending, whose re-
sponse functions are shown in Figure 4.9. The increase in current government
spending pushes aggregate demand (equation 2.57) rising GDP (Y ), which presses
the marginal cost of firms (equation 2.39) generating inflation (π). The Central
Bank, through Taylor’s Rule (equation 2.55), responds by increasing the interest
rate (RB). The bond prices decrease, which increases their demand. Households
alter their portfolios, changing investment assets (Ip) for government bonds (Bt),
and consumption (C) follows the same trend of private investment due to the op-
portunity cost generated by the increase in interest rate (equation 2.2).
If one looks at the public budget, on one hand, the increase in the GDP (Y )
raises the public investment (Ig) (equation 2.49) and the nominal income transfer
(TRANS) (equation 2.51). On the other hand, the current government spending
is a component of public spending, so if its value increases, other components of
spending (Ig and TRANS) suffer a pressure to reduce, or as appropriate, the gov-
ernment can allow a rise in public debt (equations 2.46 and 2.44) since tax rates
are unchanged. However, a higher interest rate makes it difficult to rollover debt,
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leaving this financing channel impaired. Inevitably, there is a need for spending
containment, so there is a cut in nominal income transfer. This pressure for a
smaller total government spend is also felt by the drop in revenues because the
new composition of the household budget (higher demand for government bonds
and lower acquisition of consumption and investment goods) decreases total gov-
ernment revenue (TAX) (equation 2.54).
Using Table 4.4 and Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.7, it is possible to analyze the cor-
relation4 among the results of this study and the three models chosen as study
benchmark 5, comparing the results of this model with models CA and CV, only
household consumption did not present a positive correlation. Moreover, model
MT exhibited a positive correlation with respect to consumption; however, the
result of the private investment presented inverted.
These divergent results are easy to explain. Starting from divergence with model
MT, these authors work with a balanced budget that does not have public debt. If
there was debt, the increase of the aggregate demand rises the pressure on prices
and thus a reaction of the Central Bank to raise interest rates, an event that
changes the portfolio composition of households (leaving acquire capital goods, Ip
to purchase government bonds, B). However, in model MT, even with an increase
in the interest rate, the households do not get to acquire capital goods.
The differences in consumption behavior between the models are in the assump-
tions about the rigidity of consumption (consumption habit formation and non-
Ricardian agents). The study model, like model MT, does not have a restriction
on consumption. Instead, consumption habit formation derives from when a be-
havior is repeated regularly, that behavior becomes automatic. In particular,
consumption habit formation refers to consumer happiness not only being affected
by current consumption but also by level of consumption in previous periods. The
economic literature shows different elements that cause deviations from the theory
of the permanent income life cycle. The main explanation for this result is that the
capital market is not perfect and therefore there exists a liquidity constraint for
4This is not referring to the correction coefficient of statistical theory, but only to visual
observation of the behavior of the same variable in different models.
5To facilitate reading from this point forward: the models of Castro et al (2011), Carvalho
and Valli (2011) and Mussolini and Teles (2012) are called CA, CV and MT, respectively.
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some individuals. Therefore, the inclusion of frictions in household consumption
softens the fluctuations to a given shock. Then the results between the models
would converge.
4.2.2.2 Public Investment Shock
Figure 4.10 shows the result of the shock in public investment. Two variables are
initially more sensitive to this shock: GDP (Y ) (equation 2.57) and the stock of
public capital (Kg) (equation 2.53). These two variables are pushing the marginal
cost (equation 2.39), one positively and the other negatively . While a higher ag-
gregate demand forces an increase in marginal cost of the firm (since the demand
for inputs increased), the increase in the stock of public capital facilitates the pro-
duction process This relieves the pressure on this variable, as the latter result is
greater than the first, resulting in a lower marginal cost.
This process generates a deflationary movement and the Central Bank, knowing
that motion, decreases the basic interest rate (RB) (equation 2.55). A lower inter-
est rate improves government accounts because it facilitates the rollover of debt,
which expands (B). This result leaves the fiscal policy more “loose”, without
pressing the total government spending (TS) to decline, even with a drop in rev-
enues (TAX).
One can make the same comparison with the benchmark using Table 4.4 and Fig-
ures 4.5 and 4.7. The result of the study model showed differences in relation
to three variables when compared with model CV. This is the result of different
assumptions on the behavior of firm producers of intermediate goods to minimize
costs.
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Figure 4.9: Current Government Spending shock.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Model CV has the assumption that firms can choose the composition of public and
private capitals, given the cost of each input. On the other hand, the study model
works on the assumption that a wholesale firm has a choice between private capital
and labor inputs, given the values of W and R. These different assumptions mean
that the marginal cost of the study model has more sensitivity to increases in the
stock of public capital. In this model, an increase in public capital decreases the
marginal cost, while for model CV, the opposite occurs. This event explains the
inverted behavior of the price levels in both models.
The difference in the behavior of household consumption relative to models CV
and MT, plus the private investment in the latter model, are similar to that previ-
ously discussed in the case of shock in the current government spending. To model
CV, the explanation is on the friction of consumption, while in model MT it is on
the assumption of balanced budget.
4.2.2.3 Income Transfer Shock
The third component of government spending is income transfer to households
(TRANS) (Figure 4.11 ). The shock in this variable showed no significant changes
in the real side of the economy (changes in GDP (Y ), inputs (K,T ) etc.). The
declines in nominal wages (W ) and return on capital (R) decrease the marginal
costs of wholesale firms (equation 2.39), forcing a drop in the price level (P ). This




) stay stable, without
changes in the demand of these variables.
The changes are perceptible in the variables of the government. The declines in
nominal wages (W ) and return on capital (R ) decrease the total government rev-
enue ( TAX ) (equation 2.54). To compensate for this drop, a spending restraint
(equation 2.46) is not needed. This is facilitated instead by the fall in the price
level, helping the public debt stay balanced.
Among these three models used to benchmark, just model CV has income trans-
fer to households. In Table 4.4 and Figure 4.6, the shock in this variable is able
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Figure 4.10: Public Investment shock.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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to influence the economy, and in a similar proportion to the other two shocks.
This shock influences the variables of model CV, but in the study model it does
not. The explanation is that these authors worked with heterogeneous households.
This difference between the models is what would be differentiating the results of
the shock on income transfer to households.
Figure 4.11: Income Transfer Shock.
Source: Prepared by the author.
4.2.2.4 Comparison Among the Shocks and Their Persistence
The study first analyzed the shocks alone. Then the goal was to compare each
shock and its quantitative results between them. Figure 4.12 provides a compari-
son between the three shocks (εg, εIg and εTr) related to the variables that make
up the composition of government spending. In the analysis of variance decom-
position, the study was concerned about the explanatory power of each shock. In
this section, the study is more concerned about the result of each shock.
The current government spending is the variable of composition in public spending
that affects the economy more, as the variance decomposition has shown. How-
ever, should an increase in current government spending be used as an economic
incentive? Looking at the GDP, one realizes that the current government spend-
ing affects GDP. This shock can stimulate positively the economy by two quarters.
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After this period, GDP remains below its steady state for approximately 50 quar-
ters. Then, it is noticed that the total result of this effect on GDP is negative.
Another negative consequence is the persistence of inflation. Even with the reac-
tion of the Central Bank, it remains above its steady state level for 60 quarters,
sustained by the level of labor that remains above the steady state during the
same period. This features resistance in the rate of inflation. The effects on other
variables last somewhere between 2 to 4 quarters.
On the other hand, even if the shock in public investment is showing a modest
result in the short term, its effect is maintained in the long term. So the overall
result is positive (Figure 4.13). Here, GDP growth is not enough to put pressure
on inflation rate due to the decrease in the marginal cost of firms.
A final comment is on the stability of the model in relation to shocks. All variables
go back to their steady states as seen in Figure 4.14.
4.3 Conclusions
In this chapter the objective was to study the relative effectiveness of public spend-
ing and to analyze the veracity of the underlying hypothesis that public investment
is a relatively more powerful instrument of public spending.
The results showed that current government spending, among the compositional
elements of public spending, had greater power to influence changes in the econ-
omy. Its effects in the GDP stimulated the economy by two quarters. After this
period, GDP remained below its steady state for approximately 50 quarters, but
its total result is negative. Another negative consequence was the persistence of
inflation, sustained by the level of labor that remained above the steady state
during the same period. Thus, we note the current government spending is not an
economic policy that brings positive results for the economy.
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Figure 4.12: Comparison Among the Shocks.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Figure 4.13: Long-term result on GDP of a shock in the Public Investment.
Source: Prepared by the author.
However, the shocks in public investment has a long term effect on GDP, a fact
that confirms the earlier statement that o public investment is a relatively more
powerful instrument of public spending, and this result is achieved without a pres-
sure on the inflation rate. Finally, income transfers did not affect the real economy.
Briefly, public spending was not effective in stimulating the economy in the short
term. But among these components, the public investment is more powerful in-
strument of fiscal policy.
The exercises of comparing the study model with the benchmark models were
satisfactory, because they have many points in agreement with the benchmark
models. However the inclusion of frictions in household consumption would im-
prove the model results.
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Figure 4.14: Shocks Persistence.
Source: Prepared by the author.
Chapter 5
Tax Reduction Policies and Their
Impact on the Brazilian Economy
Introduction
One of the most hotly debated topics by Brazilian economists is that country’s tax
reforms. The general feeling is that the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 initially cre-
ated a system of insufficient funding for the size of the state. Because of this, the
government had to create a series of taxes to supplement state funding, without
much concern for the economic rules of taxation. The main result of this policy,
among other factors, was a tax system that adversely affected the competitiveness
of the productive sector.
The tax literature shows significant differences among the tax reforms of many
countries in recent decades. Sandford (1993) contributed a summary listing com-
mon elements in such reforms, including reducing the number of tax rates and their
maximum marginal value in the income tax of individuals; reducing the aliquots of
corporations; and increasing the share of consumption taxes, rather than income
taxes.
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This work aims to contribute to this discussion by analyzing tax reductions through
a DSGE model1. To achieve this purpose, three stochastic shocks will be analyzed:
the shock from the tax rate on consumption, the shock from the tax rate on labor
income and the shock from the tax rate on capital income.
Extensive literature exist on the possible impact of tax reforms in Brazil. Caval-
canti and Silva (2010); Santana, Cavalcanti and Paes (2012); Paes and Bugarin
(2006); Pereira and Ferreira (2010); Araújo and Ferreira (1999); Lledo (2005); and
Salami and Fochezatto (2009) evaluated the impacts of proposed reforms in the
national tax system. Menezes and Barreto (1999) and Teles and Andrade (2006)
simulated the combined effects of tax and pension reforms. The literature cited
was built using models of overlapping generations (OLG2). Instead, this work seeks
to contribute to the discussion using a DSGE model.
The main critique of taxation in Brazil refers to the size of the tax burden (TB),
which is excessive for a developing country. To verify this concern, Figure 5.1 pro-
vides the tax burden (General Government Revenue / GDP) and the growth rate
of this variable over the period 2005 to 2013 for a set of 30 countries (developed
and developing). We notice that inside this group, Brazil has the fourteenth-
highest tax burden (37.22 %), outperforming all the BRICS countries (Russia,
South Africa, China and India (35,80%, 28,90%, 22,94% and 20%, respectively)).
It also outperforms such developed countries as Australia, Japan and United States
(33,63%, 31,68% and 30,71%, respectively). In terms of empirical evidence, this
critical comparison of Brazil’s tax burden is quite pertinent.
It is not enough just to question the size of the tax burden. The evolution of
this variable makes the situation more serious. Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of
the tax burden and the public debt-to-GDP ratio in Brazil since 1996. It can be
observed that the weight of taxes has been growing consistently since fiscal ad-
justments in the early 1990s. The positive side is the continuing decline in public
debt, which could provide an increase in government savings. However, Brazilian
1Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium. The DSGE methodology attempts to explain
aggregate economic phenomena, such as economic growth, business cycles, and the effects of
monetary and fiscal policy, based on macroeconomic models with microfoundations.
2Overlapping generations models is a modeling type that uses representative agents who live
a long enough finite period of time to overlap with at least one period of life of another agent.
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Table 5.1: General Government Revenue em 2013. Source: IMF (2014).
Country General Revenue Country General Revenue
Government Average Government Average
Revenue Growth(2005-2013) Revenue Growth(2005-2013)
Argentina 42,58 5,81 Australia 33,63 -0,4
Brazil 37,22 0,69 Canada 41,48 -0,41
Chile 22,99 0,72 China 22,94 3,41
Colombia 27,71 1,18 Denmark 57,28 0,37
France 52,87 0,59 Germany 44,69 0,13
Greece 44,76 1,03 India 20 1,23
Italy 47,78 0,77 Japan 31,68 0,89
Mexico 23,35 2,2 Netherlands 47,55 0,71
Norway 55,1 -0,06 Paraguay 20,94 1,97
Peru 21,47 2,08 Portugal 43,29 0,92
Russia 35,8 -0,13 South Africa 28,9 1,5
Spain 37,93 -0,07 Sweden 51,92 -0,37
Turkey 36,06 2,12 United Kingdom 37,74 0,46
United States 30,71 0,34 Uruguay 32,96 1,15
primary spending grew strongly over the period (see Figure 4.1 of the previous
chapter).
This characteristic growth of the tax burden is not unique to Brazil. Most coun-
tries have experienced an increasing tax burden. Table 5.1 shows that only six
countries out of 30 showed negative growth rates of the tax burden during the
period (Norway, Russia, Spain, Australia, Canada and Sweden). These countries,
with the exception of Russia, are developed. Brazil is the eighteenth-largest coun-
try in relation to growth of the tax burden. The relevance lies in the fact that
no developing country has a TB growth rate higher than Brazil’s. Briefly, the tax
burden is not only overly large but has been increasing consistently over time.
Figure 5.1: Tax revenues and public debt as ratio to GDP.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Figure 5.2 aims to show the composition of direct and indirect taxes in Brazil.
To represent these types of taxation, the following series was used: ICMS3 and
IPI4 representing revenues on the acquisition of consumer and investment goods;
individual tax on personal income 5 representing tax on labor income; and the tax
on corporate income 6 representing tax on capital income.
Notice that consumption tax is more representative (average of 7,11 %), exceeding
the value of the sum of the other two types of tax together (0,3 % and 2,5 %
for taxes on labor income and on capital income, respectively). From 2009, con-
sumption tax exceeded GDP growth; this was influenced by Brazilian Government
incentives for household consumption (see Alvarenga et al. (2010)). On the other
hand, the other two types of tax remained relatively stable throughout the period.
This chapter begins with this introduction, while Section Two presents the liter-
ature review. Section Three details the results and ends with the conclusions.
Figure 5.2: Relationship of Taxes as ratio to GDP. Tax on Labor Income
(TLI), Tax on Capital Income (TCI) and Tax on Consumption (TC).
Source: Prepared by the author.
3O Imposto sobre Operações relativas à Circulação de Mercadorias e Prestação de Serviços
de Transporte Interestadual e Intermunicipal e de Comunicação (ICMS) is a state tax whose
primary taxable event is the movement of goods.
4O Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados (IPI) is a federal tax that has as taxable events:
customs clearance of imported products, and the exit of manufactured products from the plant.
5Individual tax on personal income is a federal tax levied on all persons who have obtained
a gain above a certain minimum. The rate is variable and proportional to taxable income
6The tax on corporate income is a federal tax on all firms and individual companies. By
choice or legal determination, firms and individual companies are taxed by the following forms:
simple; deemed income; real profit; or arbitrated profit.
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5.1 Literature Review
In this section, we describe the main results for tax reduction in Brazil and the
DSGE models that have the same purpose. Importantly, the shortage of models
of this methodology directed to studies on tax reduction in Brazil. Castro et al.
(2011) and Mussolini and Teles (2012) have already been discussed in the previ-
ous chapter, and they will be the basis for comparisons in this chapter. Figure
5.3 is the result of a negative shock in net lump-sum tax in the model of Castro
et al. (2011). Another important issue regarding the Brazilian literature on tax
reduction (already mentioned in the introduction) is that the discussion focuses
on models of overlapping generations. For this reason, this section will present
some works that are references on tax reduction, but are not DSGE models.
Figure 5.3: .
Source: Modified from Castro et al (2011).
Cavalcanti and Silva (2010) have the perception that there is no consensus on the
optimal form of tax reduction for the production sector. To contribute to this
discussion the authors propose a general equilibrium model with overlapping gen-
erations in which they seek to compare measures of tax reduction on labor and
capital, both offset by increases in consumption taxation. Households pay taxes on
labor income, on capital income, on consumption, and also contribute to the social
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security system. The result of the authors’ proposition is that the elimination of
tax on capital can lead to substantial increases in capital and products relative to
the tax reduction on labor.
on capital income, on consumption, and also contribute to the social security sys-
tem. The result of the authors’ proposition is that the elimination of tax on capital
can lead to substantial increases in capital and products relative to the tax reduc-
tion on labor.
Salami and Fochezatto (2009) propose an analysis of the economic effects of dif-
ferent long-term tax options. To achieve this objective, the authors use a general
equilibrium model with overlapping generations. The article presents a tax change
with a decrease in direct taxes and an increase in indirect taxes, without changing
the tax burden. Households pay consumption tax, income tax, and social contri-
bution. The authors do not recommend replacing an indirect tax on consumption
with a direct tax on income, while maintaining the same level of public revenue.
Araújo and Ferreira (1999) studied what impacts tax reforms in the Brazilian
economy would have on welfare. They developed a dynamic general equilibrium
model with households paying taxes on the purchase of consumption goods, on
the acquisition of capital goods, on labor income and on property income. The
purpose of their study was to show that tax reform remains unchanged with the
participation of government revenue in the product. The result achieved is that
the tax reform proposed would lead to positive results in the product, employment
and capital stock.
Forni et al. (2009) used a DSGE model to estimate the effects of fiscal policy in
the Euro area. The theoretical framework of this model has non-Ricardian agents;
taxation is divided into consumption taxes, taxes on labor income and taxes on
capital income. Government expenditures are divided into purchases of goods and
services, compensation for public employees and transfers to households. The re-
sults indicate that reductions in tax rates on labor income and consumption have
significant effects on output, while reductions in tax on capital income favor in-
vestment and products in the medium term (Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6).
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Figure 5.4: Tax on Consumption Shock of the Model’s Forni et al (2009).
Source: Modified from Forni et al (2011).
5.2 Results
As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter aims to study tax reduction for
three types of taxes: tax on consumption; tax on labor income; and tax on capital
income. In the literature, the best composition has several discrepancies (Caval-
canti and Silva, 2010). Thus, every study that attempts to distinguish the results
of different tax reductions will certainly contribute to further reflections for de-
signs of fiscal policy.
5.2.1 Variance Decomposition
The variance decomposition presented in this section seeks to demonstrate the
explanatory power of the changes in each variable, given the proposed shocks in
this study. Figure 5.7 and Table 5.2 show the decomposition of the error variance
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Figure 5.5: Tax on Labor Income Shock of the Model’s Forni et al (2009).
Source: Modified from Forni et al (2011).
for the three shocks of tax reduction (εc, εl and εk).
In a general way, the shock of tax reduction on labor income is that it has greater
explanatory power in the variables. In all of these, the weight of explanation of
this shock exceeds 80%: GDP (94,57%); household consumption (99,62%); private
investment (91,83%); public investment (94,57%); current government spending
(94,57%); labor (93,54%); stock of private capital (99,37%); stock of public capi-
tal (99,62%); wages (98,04%); return on capital (98,93%); interest rate (98,54%);
inflation rate (99,74%); marginal cost of firms (99,74%); public debt (99,35%); to-
tal government spending (83,14%); total government revenue (99,1%); and income
transfers to households (83,14%).
There are two striking features of these results. The first is the superiority of the
tax reduction on labor income in relation to the other two tax reductions. Most
impressive is the weak capacity of the tax reduction on capital income to stimulate
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Figure 5.6: Tax on Capital Income Shock of the Model’s Forni et al (2009).
Source: Modified from Forni et al (2011).
increased private capital stock (among the three proposed shocks, this is the one
that least encourages increased input).
5.2.2 Analysis of Bayesian Impulse Response Functions
(IRF)
Given the estimation of the model, Bayesian impulse response functions are gen-
erated. These represent the dynamics of the main macroeconomic variables from
an exogenous shock. In this section we discuss the implications of our estimates
for the effects of three possible tax reductions.
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Table 5.2: Variance decomposition (in percent). Source: Prepared by the
author.
εc εl εk
Y 5,34 94,57 0,08
C 0,36 99,62 0,01
Ip 8,01 91,83 0,16
Ig 5,34 94,57 0,08
I 7,88 91,96 0,16
G 5,34 94,57 0,08
L 6,36 93,54 0,1
Kp 0,61 99,37 0,02
Kg 0,37 99,62 0,01
W 1,33 98,04 0,63
R 0,51 98,93 0,57
RB 1,44 98,54 0,02
π 0,25 99,74 0
Cmg 0,92 98,46 0,62
B 0,6 99,35 0,06
TS 13,09 83,14 3,77
TAX 0,38 99,1 0,52
TRANS 13,09 83,14 3,77
Figure 5.7: Variance decomposition (%).
Source: Prepared by the author.
5.2.2.1 Tax on Consumption Shock
Figure 5.8 displays the result of the tax reduction on consumption. This shock
initially affects the wage (W ) (equation 2.10) and the return on capital (R) (equa-
tion 2.11) increasing demand for labor (L) (equation 2.35) and private capital
(Kp) (equation 2.36) raising aggregate supply (Y ) (equation 2.35). The nominal
marginal cost of wholesale firms faces two effects, the first effect is positive and
comes from a higher product (Y ), and a second is negative, which originates from
the falling prices of the inputs (W and R ) (equation 2:39), and the second prevails
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over the first. With a higher output, current government spending (G) (2:47 equa-
tion) and public investment (Ig) (equation 2.49) receive a boost. This increases
the stock of public capital, which also helps to decrease the nominal marginal
cost. However, the price level decreases enough to increase the real marginal cost,
and exert pressure on the inflation rate, causing the Central Bank to increase the
interest rate (RB) (equation 2.55).
The decrease in total government revenue, coupled with the increase in interest
rates (which affects the rollover of debt) exerts pressure on the fiscal budget for a
retrenchment. The government addresses this need by reducing income transfers
to households (TRANS) (equation 2.44). The effect on the economy due to tax
reduction on consumption is very short; it is held in just two quarters. The work
of Forni et al (2009) (Figure 5.4) shows similar results for the Euro area. However,
the effects of this type of tax is more persistent (15 quarters)7.
5.2.2.2 Tax on Labor Income Shock
The tax reduction on labor income is presented in Figure 5.8. After the reduction
of this tax, households accept a lower real wage (W/P ) (equation 2.10) (since
their disposable income increased). The wholesalers’ firms demand more labor
input (L) (equation 2.35), which increases aggregate supply (Y ) (equation 2.25).
This increase in output raises current government spending (G) (equation 2.47)
and public investment (Ig) (equation 2.49). Households with greater disposable
income increase their spending on consumption goods (C) and private investment
(Ip), and demand a greater amount of government bonds (B) (equation 2.2).
After the maturation period of government investment, the stock of public capital
is increased (Kg) (equation 2.53); this decreases the nominal marginal cost (equa-
tion 2.39), which creates a deflationary process (π), and the Central Bank sees
space for an expansionary monetary policy (lower interest rates (RB)) (equation
2.55). This decreases the demand for government bonds because of the increase
in the price of the asset (if RB decreases, PB = frac1RB increases).
7There is a need for some caution in comparing the model of this work with the model of
Forni et al. (2009) due to the fact that the first is directed at the Brazilian economy, while the
second was developed for the Eurozone.
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Figure 5.8: Tax on Consumption Shock.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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In this process of falling interest rates, the government has space to work with a
larger stock of government debt, a fact that helps maintain spending (equation
2.44), even with the drop in total revenue (equation 2.54). However, the gov-
ernment prefers to make cuts in income transfer to households (TRANS) (2.46
equation), because there is less need for this type of social policy, since the econ-
omy is expanding.
The shock in this tax also resembles the work of Forni et al. (2009) (Figure 5.5),
with some differences in relation to the inflation rate and the interest rate. But
here the tax reduction on income labor persists for more than 15 periods in both
studies.
5.2.2.3 Tax on Capital Income Shock
The third tax reduction proposed in this chapter concerns the tax on capital income
(Figure 5.9). This shock causes a decrease in real return on capital (R/P ) (equa-
tion 2.11), thus firms require more private capital (Kp) (equation 2.36), raising the
product (Y ) (equation 2.25). Households perceive an opportunity to increase the
purchase of investment goods (since tax is lower in this sector), which decreases
aggregate consumption (C) (equation 2.2). Current government spending (G)
(Equation 2.47) plus public investment (Ig) (Equation 2.49) grow due to higher
product. The stock of public capital (Kg) increases by decreasing the nominal
marginal cost. Inflation that initially rose now starts to sag due to the decrease
in marginal cost.
With smaller total revenue, and with the difficulty of rolling government debt,
the government decreases transfer income to households. Two other differences
between the shocks deserve comment. Among the three shocks on tax reduction,
household consumption decreases only in this shock. The reason is the increased
demand for investment goods, given the opportunity cost due to lower tax on cap-
ital income. Furthermore, the increase in the stock of capital is the main result of
this tax reduction; however, it is lower than the results of other shocks. Finally,
the persistence of the effects is similar to the consumption tax, two quarters.
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Figure 5.9: Tax on Labor Income Shock.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Comparing this shock with the same one of Forni et al. (2009), the results are
similar. The effects on output, investment and interest rates are positive, while
the effect on consumption is negative. Moreover, like the shock on consumption
tax, the persistence of the effects diverges. While in this work the effects of the
shock on capital income tax remain two quarters, in the work of Forni et al. (2009)
they exceed 15 tax quarters.
5.2.2.4 Comparison between the Shocks and their Persistence
Analyzing Figure 5.11 the superiority of the result of the tax reduction on labor in
relation to the two other alternatives is undeniable. Its effect on output persists
for more than 20 quarters. In relation to household consumption and public and
private capitals, the effects are greater than 60 quarters. The downside is the
persistence of government debt. Regarding stability, all variables return to their
steady state (Figure 5.12).
Given that the works of Castro et al. (2011) and Mussolini and Teles (2012) use a
lump-sum tax, we are left to comment on the similarities among these results in this
subsection. The results of Figure 5.11 and 5.3 are similar with regard to product,
household consumption, government spending, real wage and amount of work.
Mussolini and Teles (2012) obtained results similar to ours for the four variables
presented by the authors, both in their shift directions as in the persistence of the
shock (Figure 4.7) 8.
5.3 Conclusions
This chapter aimed to study possibilities for tax reduction through three stochas-
tic shocks in the tax rates on consumption, on labor income and on capital income.
The results show that the tax reduction on labor income is the most effective in
stimulating the economy. First, the size of the increases, and secondly by the
8This should reverse the reasoning for the comparison of this work with Mussolini and Teles
(2012), as these authors worked with a shock of tax increase.
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Figure 5.10: Tax on Capital Income Shock.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Figure 5.11: Comparison between the Shocks.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Figure 5.12: Shocks Persistence.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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persistence of result. In this shock, the product is maintained for over 20 quarters,
while for the other two shocks, incentives lose strength in two quarters. This result
contradicts that obtained by Cavalcanti and Silva (2010) who found that the tax
reduction on the capital factor has better results than on labor.
Looking at the public budget and tax reductions in consumption tax and capital
income tax, there is a need for the government to reduce its share in the economy,
since its revenue decreased, and the increase in interest rates undermined public
debt management. Then, the channel for reduced spending was the income trans-
fer to households. In the case of tax reduction on labor income, the decline in
interest rates makes it easy to rolling the public debt, and even with a drop in
revenues, the government does not need to introduce spending cuts, but decreases
the income transfer to households by choice, unlike the other two cases.
Briefly, the best choice for tax reduction is on labor income, due to persistence in
the GDP effects and the better overall state of the economy. There is an increase




The main objective of this study was to analyze possibilities of fiscal policy for
the Brazilian economy, both on the side of public spending and on the side of tax
reduction. For this purpose six stochastic shocks were performed: current govern-
ment spending; public investment; transfer income to households; tax reduction on
consumption; tax reduction on labor income; and tax reduction on capital income.
The result of this study is that the shocks in government spending is lower than
shocks in tax reduction (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). Of the three possibilities of policies
spending, the only positive outcome is the public investment. Even so, it is less
to the three policies of tax reduction. Importantly, the only fiscal policy that
generated an inflationary process was the shock on current government spending.
Even the other shock that stimulates household spending - tax reduction on con-
sumption - the result was fall in inflation. The other three shocks negatively affect
the marginal cost, event that drops the level of prices. Among the policies of tax
reduction, the tax reduction on labor income showed more significant results with
increased GDP and drop in the level of prices.
In order to complete this discussion on the better fiscal policy, we seek to identify
the Keynesian multiplier for each of the six proposed this study. Thus, we tested a
shock of the same proportion (ε = 1) for each proposal. The multiplier is obtained
in the same way of the ”old Keynesian”, α = ∂Y
∂public spending
or α = ∂Y
∂tax reduction
,
in simple terms, we are getting the gray area in Figure 6.1. Table 6.1 displays
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Figure 6.1: Keynesian multipliers. Here, all shocks are getting the same value,
ε = 1.
Source: Prepared by the author.
Figure 6.2: Inflationary Process.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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these results.
The multiplier of current government spending had a negative result, meaning
that for every R$ 1 billion increase in this fiscal policy the GDP falls in R$ 0,7
billion1. The other possibilities of fiscal policies had positive results, however the
only fiscal incentive that has multiplier effect is the tax reduction on labor income
(α = 1, 2). Indicating be the better proposal for fiscal stimulus.
Table 6.1: Keynesian multipliers (α). Source: Prepared by the author.
εG εIg εTr εc εl εk
-0,7 0,15 0 0,23 1,2 0,23
Briefly, this study was able to answer the initial proposal (analyze possibilities of
fiscal policy for the Brazilian economy). For future work, it would be interesting to
consider some frictions not used here. Could be incorporated consumption habits,
non-Ricardian agents, the cost of adjusting investment among others.
1This result is close to the value for the Euro area using the model Smets and Wouters (2003).
Where results of the multipliers to possibilities of fiscal packages in 2011Q1 and 2013Q4 were
-0,2 and -0,34, respectively (Cwik and Wieland, 2009 ).
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Figure A.1: Impulse Responses to a Transitory Technology Shock.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Figure A.2: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Figure A.3: Impulse Responses to a Risk Premium Shock.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Figure A.4: Impulse Responses to a Household Preferences Shock.
Source: Prepared by the author.
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Figure A.5: Impulse Responses to a Supply Labor Shock.
Source: Prepared by the author.
